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ARTICLES 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AS A GALAXY OF  
NORMS 
ELISE GROULX DIGGS*, MITT REGAN**, AND BEATRICE PARANCE***  
ABSTRACT 
In the last several years, there has been an increasing tendency to view the 
impacts of transnational business operations through the lens of human rights 
law. A major obstacle to holding companies accountable for the harms that they 
impose, however, has been the separate legal identity of corporate subsidiaries 
and of contractors in a company’s supply chain. France’s recently enacted duty 
of vigilance statute seeks to overcome this obstacle by imposing a duty on compa-
nies to identify potential serious human rights violations by their subsidiaries 
and by companies with which they have an “established commercial relation-
ship.” Failure to engage in such vigilance can subject a company to liability for 
damages resulting from such failure. 
This Article situates the new French duty of vigilance within a broader set of 
norms that can be characterized as the Business and Human Rights Galaxy. 
This Galaxy consists of five rings that represent standards and expectations 
ranging from classic enforceable “hard law” to voluntary principles generated 
by private parties, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and international organiza-
tions. The provisions in these rings are related in fluid and dynamic ways and 
exert varying degrees of gravitational influence on one another. Thus, for 
* Avocate a` la Cour, Barrister & Solicitor (Paris, Que´bec); Associate Tenant Doughty Street 
Chambers (London, United Kingdom); Principal, BI for Business Integrity & Partners 
(Washington, D.C.); Co-Director Program Lawyers, Business and Human Rights, Center on 
Ethics & the Legal Profession, Georgetown University Law Center. We would like to acknowledge 
the important contribution of Ms. Eve Tessera, Attorney at law both in Paris (France) and Verona 
(Italy) in helping us conceive and realize the diagrams presented in this Article. We would also 
like to acknowledge the contribution of Mr. Anthony Cooper, J.D. Tulane (L.A.) and member of 
the New York Bar, for his precious assistance in helping update this Article throughout the review 
process. Finally, we would like to express our appreciation to Aure Demoulin-Bouchier, 
Georgetown University Law Center class of 2018, for her excellent assistance with this Article. 
VC 2019, Elise Groulx Diggs, Mitt Regan, and Beatrice Parance. 
** McDevitt Professor of Jurisprudence; Director, Center on Ethics and the Legal Profession, 
Georgetown University Law Center. 
*** Associate Professor, UPL, Law School University Paris 8 Vincennes – Saint – Denis, France; 
Director of the Research or Research Director Center in Private Law and Health Law (EA number 
1581˚); Member of the French National Commission for Ethics and Warnings in terms of Public 
Health and Environment. 
309 
instance, what are conventionally regarded as forms of hard law may draw on 
voluntary private standards in setting expectations for behavior, and soft law 
norms may be incorporated into legally enforceable contract provisions between 
companies and their suppliers. This Article suggests that appreciation of these 
dynamics can furnish guidance in interpreting the novel duty of vigilance that 
the new French statute establishes. In particular, the common law duty of care 
and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
can illuminate the nature and scope of the duty of vigilance. At the same time, 
the introduction of the new French statute into the Business and Human 
Rights Galaxy means that it too has the potential to influence provisions in 
other rings of the Galaxy.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Business enterprises over the past few decades increasingly operate 
in multiple countries around the globe, manufacturing their products 
and acquiring resources in jurisdictions where they find the best 
returns on investment. Those returns are affected by the costs of com-
plying with regulations regarding matters such as working conditions, 
employee compensation, and the impact of operations on the environ-
ment and local communities. Wide variations in the strength of these 
regulations across the world thus create incentives to conduct activities 
in countries where legal requirements are least demanding. This cre-
ates a “governance gap” with respect to “the prevention of, and 
accountability for, direct or indirect corporate human rights abuses in 
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host states and the provision of redress to victims of such abuses.”1 This 
enables companies to reap financial benefits from their operations 
without being responsible for many of the adverse impacts of their 
activities. 
One way to close this gap would be for companies that control multi-
ple entities in various countries to be subject to regulation by the coun-
tries in which they are incorporated and have their headquarters. 
These, generally, are jurisdictions in which regulatory obligations are 
more demanding.2 A major obstacle to this, however, is the insulation 
of a parent company from liability for the harms inflicted by its subsid-
iaries or by companies that are part of its supply chain.3 The doctrine of 
limited liability based on separate legal identity provides that, notwith-
standing their status as members of a corporate family, subsidiaries are 
distinct entities that bear sole responsibility for their operations.4 
Similarly, suppliers are simply third parties who are engaged in contrac-
tual relationships with parent companies. The result has been to limit 
recovery to the assets of the subsidiary or supplier. Perhaps even more 
important, it also subjects any claims to review in the legal system in the 
jurisdiction in which these entities are incorporated.5 In developing 
countries that lack a robust judicial system and rule of law, this can cre-
ate substantial obstacles to any redress. 
In 2017, France took a major step toward reducing this impediment 
to accountability by enacting a statute that imposes a “duty of vigilance” 
on companies with a substantial presence in France.6 
Code de Commerce [C. com.] [Commercial Code] art. L. 225-102-4, https://www.business- 
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Texte%20PPL_EN-US.docx (Fr.). Article 1 of 
the new Code provides that the law applies to “any company that employs, at the end of two 
consecutive years, at least five thousand employees within itself, as well as within its direct or 
indirect subsidiaries headquartered on French territory, or at least ten thousand employees 
within itself, as well as within its direct or indirect subsidiaries headquartered on French territory 
or abroad.” Ste´phane Brabant & Elsa Savourey, French Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance, a 
Such companies 
1. PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE 9 (2014). 
2. See generally id. 
3. Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ 
Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769 (2015); Re´gis Bismuth, 
La responsabilite´ (limite´e) de l’entreprise multinationale et son organisation juridique interne – Quelques 
re´flexions autour d’un accident de l’histoire, L’ENTREPRISE MULTINATIONALE ET LE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, SFDI, PARIS, PEDONE 429 (2017) (Fr.). 
4. Meredith Dearborn, Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 195, 199 (2009) (“This governing principle [of limited liability] of the parent- 
subsidiary relationship has influenced corporate law throughout the fifty states, and most 
practitioners, judges, and commentators take it for granted.”). 
5. Skinner, supra note 3, at 1787-99. 
6. 
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Practical and Multidimensional Perspective, 50 Revue International de la Compliance et de 
l’e´thique des Affaires (2017); Claire Bright, Creating a Legislative Level-Playing Field in Business 
and Human Rights at the European Level: Is the French Law on the Duty of Vigilance the Way 
Forward?, SSRN (Aug. 8, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262787; Anne Triponel & John 
Sherman, Legislating Human Rights Due Diligence: Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls to the 
French Duty of Vigilance Law, Int’l Bar Ass’n (May 17, 2017), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/ 
Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=e9dd87de-cfe2-4a5d-9ccc-8240edb67de3. 
are required to establish and implement a “vigilance plan.”7 
Code de commerce [C. com.] [Commercial Code] art. L. 225-102-4, https://www.business- 
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Texte%20PPL_EN-US.docx (Fr.). 
This plan 
must include: 
[R]easonable vigilance measures to allow for risk identification 
and for the prevention of severe violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, serious bodily injury or environmental 
damage or health risks resulting directly or indirectly from the 
operations of the company and of the companies it controls . . .
as well as from the operations of the subcontractors or suppli-
ers with whom it maintains an established commercial relation-
ship, when such operations derive from this relationship.8 
A plan must include the following measures:  
1. 
 
 
 
A mapping that identifies, analyses and ranks risks;  
2. Procedures to regularly assess, in accordance with the risk 
mapping, the situation of subsidiaries, subcontractors or 
suppliers with whom the company maintains an established 
commercial relationship;  
3. Appropriate action to mitigate risks or prevent serious 
violations;  
4. An alert mechanism that collects reporting of existing or 
actual risks, developed in working partnership with the 
trade union organizations’ representatives of the company 
concerned; 
5. A monitoring scheme to follow up on the measures imple-
mented and assess their efficiency.   
The vigilance plan and its effective implementation report 
shall be publicly disclosed[.]9 
Companies that fail to meet their vigilance obligation will be respon-
sible for the damage that “the execution of these obligations could 
7. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
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have prevented.”10 The French Constitutional Court held that authority 
in the statute for a court to impose a civil penalty of between e10–e30 
million was unconstitutional, because the scope of the duty was not suf-
ficiently precise as the basis for a fine.11 
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2017-750DC, March 23, 
2017 (Fr.), https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2017/2017750DC.htm (French law 
on the duty of vigilance of parent corporations and contracting companies). 
It otherwise upheld the law. 
Parties who claim harm resulting from breach of the duty of vigilance 
may file a claim under French tort law.12 Since the duty is an obligation 
of process (obligation de moyens) and not of outcomes (obligation de re´sul-
tat), a plaintiff has the burden of proving that failure of the law led to 
the harms that occurred.13 
Assemble´e Nationale, PPL relative au devoir de vigilance des socie´te´s me`res et des entreprises 
donneuses d’ordre no. 2578 (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/ 
pion2578.asp (explanatory statement in support of the French law, according to the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) adopted unanimously by the 
Human Rights Council of the United Nations in June 2011 and according also to the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinationals as revised in 2011. The draft legislation was designed to impose a 
“duty of vigilance” on multinational enterprises. It was framed to cover both parent companies in 
France and major French purchasers of goods manufactured in global supply chains, to establish a 
degree of liability for multinational corporations acting in France or abroad, and to secure some 
compensation for the victims in case of human rights violations and damage to the environment.). 
The statute thus represents a potential major step in holding transna-
tional companies responsible for operations by entities with which they 
are closely associated, notwithstanding those entities’ separate legal 
identity.14 
The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development also is reportedly in 
the process of drafting similar legislation applicable to German companies and their foreign 
subsidiaries and contractors, which would “require companies to carry out internal supply chain 
risk assessments, appoint a compliance officer to monitor compliance with the law’s 
requirements, as well as establish an effective complaints mechanism for foreign workers.” German 
Development Ministry Drafts Law on Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence for German Companies, 
BUS. & HUMAN RIGHT RES. CTR. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/ 
german-development-ministry-drafts-law-on-mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence-for-german- 
companies. 
As the Constitutional Court’s decision suggests, however, the 
law leaves important issues open for interpretation. Its novelty means 
that there is no jurisprudence with respect to a comparable statute that 
may be helpful in interpreting the law. This does not mean, however, 
that there are no sources of guidance available, or that the law that 
develops around the statute should proceed in a self-contained way. 
10. Id. art. 2. 
11. 
12. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1240 (Fr.). According to article 1240 of the French 
Civil Code, a person who causes damage to another person by his/her act or omission is bound to 
provide remedy when fault is established. 
13. 
14. 
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This Article suggests that the French law should be seen as part of what 
we call a Business and Human Rights “Galaxy” of norms that has been 
emerging over the past several years.15 Various norms in this Galaxy can 
offer guidance on how the French duty of diligence should be con-
strued and applied. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a galaxy as a “system of mil-
lions or billions of stars, together with gas and dust, held together by 
gravitational attraction.”16 
Galaxy, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
galaxy (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). 
As we describe below, the Business and 
Human Rights Galaxy is comprised of numerous norms that take the 
form of measures such as statutes, regulations, reporting requirements, 
common law duties, private voluntary standards, corporate codes of 
conduct, non-governmental organization (NGO) best practices, inter-
national organization handbooks and checklists, and other sources. As 
we will describe, these norms can be conceptualized as occupying dis-
tinctive concentric rings around a core ring of enforceable “hard” law. 
The metaphor of a galaxy underscores that the norms in each ring, and 
the rings themselves, exert various degrees of gravitational force on 
one another. This can blur sharp distinctions between enforceable 
“hard” law on the one hand and voluntary standards and “soft law” on 
the other. 
As we discuss below, this Galaxy may contain multiple potential sour-
ces of guidance in interpreting the French duty of diligence. Of particu-
lar note, we suggest that duties of care and vigilance occupy a similar 
position in the Galaxy that mediates between voluntary and enforcea-
ble obligations. Recognizing the existence of this Galaxy, and the ways 
in which norms within it may inform the understanding of the duty of 
vigilance, illuminates how international law on the human rights 
impacts of business operations is emerging as a distinctive domain. 
Part II of this Article will first situate the French duty of vigilance in 
the context of the concept of human rights due diligence articulated in 
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
Parts III and IV will then describe the norms that occupy positions in 
the five concentric rings of the Business and Human Rights Galaxy. 
Finally, Part V will suggest how norms in various rings of this Galaxy 
may provide guidance on how the duty of vigilance should be inter-
preted and applied. 
15. See infra app. at 59-61. 
16. 
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II. THE U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGP) were unanimously adopted by the U.N. Human Rights 
Council in 2011.17 That same year, the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises were revised to incorporate these Principles.18 
Les principes directeurs de l’OCDE a` l’intention des entreprises multinationals (2011), 
www.oecd.org/fr/investissement/mne/2011102-fr.pdf. 
In just a few 
years, an international consensus has been coalescing around these 
instruments as expressions of the basic norms that define responsible 
corporate behavior. 
The UNGPs declare that the fundamental responsibility of busi-
ness organizations is to respect human rights. The Commentary to 
Article 11 says that this responsibility is “a global standard of 
expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they oper-
ate,” which “exists over and above compliance with national laws and 
regulations protecting human rights.”19 The commentary to Article 
12 says that an authoritative list of “the core internationally recog-
nized human rights” is set forth in the International Bill of Rights 
and the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The former consists of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.20 Article 13 of 
the UNGPs says that the responsibility to respect human rights 
requires that companies: “(a) [a]void causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and 
address such impacts when they occur,” and “(b) [s]eek to prevent 
or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to 
their operations, products or services by their business relationships, 
even if they have not contributed to those impacts.”21 
A crucial means of fulfilling these responsibilities is the conduct of 
“human rights due diligence.”22 The commentary to Article 18 of the 
UNGPs says: 
17. UNITED NATIONS GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, HR/PUB/11/04 
(2011) [hereinafter UNGP]; LES PRINCIPES DIRECTEURS DE L’OCDE �A L’INTENTION DES ENTREPRISES 
MULTINATIONALS, OECD (2011). 
18. 
19. UNGP, supra note 17, art. 11, Commentary. 
20. Id. art. 12, Commentary. 
21. Id. art. 13. 
22. Id. art. 17. 
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The initial step in conducting human rights due diligence is to 
identify and assess the nature of the actual and potential 
adverse human rights impacts with which a business enterprise 
may be involved. The purpose is to understand the specific 
impacts on specific people, given a specific context of 
operations.23 
The commentary emphasizes that due diligence is an ongoing 
process: 
Because human rights situations are dynamic, assessments of 
human rights impacts should be undertaken at regular inter-
vals: prior to a new activity or relationship; prior to major deci-
sions or changes in the operation (e.g. market entry, product 
launch, policy change, or wider changes to the business); in 
response to or anticipation of changes in the operating envi-
ronment (e.g. rising social tensions); and periodically through-
out the life of an activity or relationship.24 
A requirement of due diligence reflects the assumption that prevent-
ing harms is preferable to imposing liability after harms are inflicted, 
and that corporations are in the best position to determine how to do 
so. Companies have substantial resources devoted to assessing business 
risk and performance, as well as legal compliance, which can be 
employed to anticipate the harms that may occur as a result of their 
operations. 
Due diligence is particularly crucial in fragile states or in areas of 
weak governance, when local regulations are confusing, vague, or even 
nonexistent due to the weakness of the legislative branch. In addition, 
the application of these local laws may be susceptible to unpredictabil-
ity due to lack of judicial independence and/or corruption of the judi-
ciary. The result in such cases is inadequate protection for victims of 
human rights violations. 
Human rights due diligence may appear to resemble diligence for 
legal compliance purposes, in that both attempt to ensure that a com-
pany acts in accordance with social expectations. There are at least two 
important differences, however, that illuminate the way in which 
human rights due diligence involves greater uncertainty for a company. 
First, the focus of such diligence is not the risk to the company but to 
23. Id. art. 18, Commentary. 
24. Id. 
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stakeholders who are affected by its operations.25 Identifying relevant 
stakeholders is challenging in some cases, given the wide ripples that a 
company may generate from its activities. To whom does the company 
have a duty—that is, how far does the circle of stakeholders extend? 
What kind of priority should each group have, and how should a com-
pany balance stakeholder interests if they are not harmonious? 
Second, legal compliance due diligence assesses risk with respect to 
explicit enforceable rules. While there may be some disagreement 
about how these rules should be interpreted, there are agencies and 
courts that are authorized to provide guidance on what the rules 
require and prohibit.26 
A first critical analysis and assessment of the first published compliance plans has just been 
made public by the Business and Human Rights Association. Study relative to corporate 
enforcement of the law on the duty of diligence (“devoir de vigilance”). EDH & B&L, 
APPLICATION DE LA LOI SUR LE DEVOIR DE VIGILANCE (Apr. 2018), https://www.e-dh.org/ 
userfiles/Edh_2018_Etude_FR_V8.pdf. 
While some ambiguity may remain, a company 
nonetheless has a reasonably clear understanding of what constitutes a 
violation of its legal obligations. By contrast, human rights typically are 
expressed in broad and general terms, and there is no single source 
that provides authoritative guidance on what they mean.27 While there 
are egregious cases of clear rights violations, a company otherwise may 
find it difficult to know whether its operations contravene its duty to 
respect human rights. 
For these reasons, it is useful to think of business and human rights 
norms not as a hierarchy of binding provisions, but as a Galaxy com-
prised of multiple forms of guidance with differing legal effects, formu-
lated by both public and private entities. These forms may consist of 
legislation, case law, industry standards, corporate codes of conduct, 
guidelines established by international bodies and NGOs, supplier con-
tracts, loan agreements, and other types of instruments. Some elements 
of the Galaxy are applicable in particular industries or regions, while 
others pertain to certain types of harms. Some set forth reporting obli-
gations, others stipulate certain procedures, while still others prescribe 
substantive behavior. In these respects, we can see the Galaxy as an 
example in the business and human rights domain of what has been 
called “transnational governance.”28 
25. Ste´phane Brabant, Elsa Savourey & Charlotte Michon, The Vigilance Plan, Cornerstone of the 
Law on the Corpororate Duty of Vigilance, 50 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE LA COMPLIANCE ET DE 
L’ETHIQUE DES AFFAIRES (2017) (Fr.). 
26. 
27. RHONA K. SMITH, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 153-54 (2014). 
28. See generally JAN-CHRISTOPHE GRAZ ANDREAS NOLKE, TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 
AND ITS LIMITS (2008); GOVERNANCE ACROSS BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL FIELDS AND TRANSVERSAL 
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This conceptual framework highlights the way in which human rights 
norms are expanding and taking shape in an interconnected field in 
which traditional distinctions between “hard” and “soft” law, and 
between voluntary and mandatory responsibilities, are blurring. 
Regardless of its formal status, each element in the Galaxy has the 
potential to exert a certain amount of gravitational force on others. 
This situation means that corporate boards of directors and counsel 
must attend not simply to currently enforceable legal obligations, but 
to trends in other parts of the Galaxy that shape stakeholder expecta-
tions. These expectations may pose financial and reputational risks for 
companies even if they are not legally enforceable. To the extent that 
consensus emerges around these expectations, they also may provide 
an indication of future statutory or common law regulations as sources 
of legal obligations. Furthermore, so-called public “soft law,” or unen-
forceable voluntary private standards, may acquire the status of “hard 
law” through incorporation into contracts, adoption in legislation, or 
reliance on them in defining a common law duty of care. Companies 
that seek to anticipate and minimize risk therefore must appreciate the 
interrelated nature of the norms that comprise the Business and 
Human Rights Galaxy, and the ways that liability is expanding within it. 
III. CONCENTRIC RINGS IN THE GALAXY29 
One way to conceptualize the Business and Human Rights Galaxy is 
as a series of concentric rings of norms that expand outward from: (1) a 
ring of legal responsibility for violations of substantive rights; to rings 
that include (2) legal responsibility for compliance with non-financial 
reporting requirements; (3) legal responsibility for compliance with a 
standard of behavior that requires identifying and minimizing the risk 
of rights violations, such as the common law duty of care and the 
French statutory duty of vigilance; (4) private voluntary standards and 
codes of conduct; and (5) guidelines contained in instruments devel-
oped by international organizations such as the U.N. and the ILO. The 
THEMES 17-19 (Leonhard Dobusch, Philip Mader & Cigrid Quack eds., 2013); HANDBOOK OF 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS 30 (Thomas Hale & David Held 
eds., 2011); NETWORKED GOVERNANCE, TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW 262 (Mark 
Fenwick, Steven Van Uystel & Stefan Wrbka eds., 2014); TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: 
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 139 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Kierstin Sahlin-Andersson 
eds., 2006); Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory State: 
Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001 (2016); Milton 
C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Globalization, and Transnational Governance Regimes, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 133 (2016). 
29. See infra app. at 59-61. 
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Appendix to this article contains figures that depict these rings, as well 
examples of specific types of norms in each that reflect their consider-
able growth from 2000-2019. As we will describe, violations of responsi-
bilities in the first three rings are the basis for civil and, in some cases, 
criminal liability. The cluster of norms in each ring of the Galaxy has 
the potential to affect norms in other rings. Sources of expectations 
and liability thus are diverse and are related in complex ways rather 
than in a hierarchical order. 
While the Galaxy provides a general description of business and 
human rights norms, it also provides a useful way of analyzing norms 
that are relevant to specific countries, commercial sectors, and types of 
human rights risks. Companies that operate in multiple jurisdictions 
must be aware of the different galaxies that are relevant to their opera-
tions, as well as how the extraterritorial scope of some of the norms can 
affect the interrelationship among the different rings. 
A. Ring One: Legal Responsibility for Outcomes 
This first cluster includes provisions that impose liability for 
outcomes—violations of human rights. These include domestic crimi-
nal law, such as the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act (TVPRA)30 and the U.S. law prohibiting peonage and slavery,31 
international criminal law relating to crimes against humanity,32 and 
statutory civil liability.33 
The French law on the duty of vigilance34 
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-102-4, https://www. 
business-humanrights.org/en/french-duty-of-vigilance-bill-english-translation (Fr.). 
is located in Ring One, 
because it is the first of its kind to create a legal obligation for corpora-
tions to adopt plans of vigilance and provides for mechanisms of civil 
liability (similar to torts law in common law countries) in the event a 
plan is not adopted, published and sufficient to prevent and mitigate 
risks to human rights and others specified by the law. 
The U.K. Modern Slavery Act, for example, prohibits slavery, servi-
tude, forced labor, and trafficking in such activity, with criminal penal-
ties for violating its terms.35 
See generally Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2015/30/contents/enacted. 
Provisions of human rights conventions 
30. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-14 (2018). 
31. See generally, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6901-7002 (2016). 
32. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. 
33. The U.S. law on peonage and slavery, for instance, provides for civil liability to victims. See 
18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2018). 
34. 
35. 
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that countries incorporate into domestic law also provide a source of 
potential liability.36 States that ratify many such conventions have an 
obligation to secure enjoyment of the rights in them by adopting 
appropriate domestic legislation that imposes obligations on private 
parties to respect human rights, and to provide penalties for violation 
of such rights.37 
With regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for instance, see 
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/add/13 
(May 12, 2004), https://www.refworld.org/docid/478b26ae2.html (“[T]he positive obligations on 
States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by 
the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed 
by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they 
are amenable to application between private persons or entities.”). 
Administrative regulations also may impose substantive responsibil-
ities with respect to outcomes. One such regulation, for instance, is the 
U.S. government’s prohibition on human trafficking by federal govern-
ment contractors.38 The rule requires federal contractors performing 
work on contracts that exceed $500,000 outside of the United States to 
certify that neither they nor any of their suppliers are engaged in any 
trafficking activities.39 Contractors must take steps to prevent any pro-
hibited activities, and to terminate any subcontractor who engages in 
them.40 Any contractor in violation of the rule may be suspended or 
debarred from government contracts.41 
36. Countries in the Council of Europe, for instance, generally have incorporated into 
domestic law the obligations contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. See, e.g., 
Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
37. 
38. Federal Acquisition Regulation; Ending Trafficking in Persons, 80 Fed. Reg. 4,967 (Jan. 29, 
2015) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 9, 12, 22, 42, and 52). 
39. Combatting Trafficking in Persons, 48 C.F.R. §§ 22.1703, 22.1705 (2012). 
40. Id. § 22.1703. 
41. 
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See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 448 (June 2018), https://www. 
state.gov/documents/organization/282798.pdf (“DOJ and other federal law enforcement 
agencies continued to investigate allegations of debt bondage and excessive recruitment fees 
required of third-country nationals working on certain U.S. government contracts abroad, but no 
federal criminal prosecutions of employers or labor contractors resulted from these investigations 
in FY 2017. DoD took action against noncompliant employers or labor contractors from U.S. 
programs resulting in twenty-two suspensions, six debarments, one job termination, and one 
compliance agreement”); see also Neil Gordon, POGO Identifies Defense Contractor Recently Sanctioned 
for Human Trafficking Abuses, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.pogo. 
org/investigation/2018/08/pogo-identifies-defense-contractors-recently-sanctioned-for-human- 
trafficking-abuses/ (“POGO has identified two companies that are not U.S.-based that were 
impacted by the law; they were recently sanctioned by the government for violating U.S. 
restrictions on human trafficking. An official in the Pentagon’s watchdog told POGO that 
Tamimi Global Company and Texas Gulf Global General Trading & Contracting Company were 
B. Ring Two: Legal Responsibility for Reporting 
The second concentric cluster consists of non-financial legal report-
ing requirements. The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act,42 
for instance, requires retailers and manufacturers with $100 million or 
more in total worldwide revenues that do business in the state to report 
on their efforts to identify and prevent human trafficking in their sup-
ply chains.43 The remedy for a violation of the Act is injunctive relief by 
the State Attorney General, although the Act says that nothing in the 
legislation is intended to limit the availability of remedies for violation 
of other state or federal law.44 
The Act requires only that a company disclose its efforts with regard 
to trafficking and slavery, and does not require the adoption of any spe-
cific policies regarding these practices. Nonetheless, as one law firm 
suggested, “fair trade activists are likely to be aggressive in using the stat-
ute to shame corporations that have deficient anti-human trafficking 
programs.”45 
SHEPPARD MULLIN, Human Trafficking and Your Supply Chain: New Disclosure Requirements for 
Companies Doing Business in California (Oct. 7, 2011), https://www.sheppardmullin.com/ 
publications-articles-1366.html. 
A similar provision, the U.K. Modern Slavery Act, went into effect in 
2015.46 Unlike the California Act, it imposes disclosure obligations on 
any company with revenue of more than £36.000.000 that does business 
in the United Kingdom.47 The Act provides not only for disclosures sim-
ilar to those under the California Act, but also extends the penalty for 
persons convicted of holding anyone in slavery or servitude, or engag-
ing in human trafficking, from fourteen years to life imprisonment.48 
Another example of a targeted disclosure requirement is the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), an effort to address 
corruption in the extractives industry.49 
two of the companies referred to, although not by name, in a recent State Department report.”). 
The two aforementioned companies were suspended/debarred, but the government is not 
publishing information because of open criminal investigations. 
42. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, S.B. 657, 2010 Cal. Stat. 556 (codified at 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43). 
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(2)(A). 
44. Id. § 1714.43(d). 
45. 
46. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30 (Eng.). 
47. Id. § 54(9) (stating that the Secretary of State can make a determination of revenue). 
48. Id. § 5(3). 
49. While corruption involves a number of distinct issues beyond the scope of this Article, the 
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights suggests that it can be connected in 
several ways to human rights abuses. It can lead to violation of a state’s responsibility “to take steps 
. . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
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Companies in this industry face 
realization of the rights recognized in the [International] Covenant [on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights].” Corruption can also result in discrimination in the provision of such services in 
favor of those who can furnish bribes and other benefits to government officials. As the U.N. 
notes, “[t]he economically and politically disadvantaged suffer disproportionately from the 
consequences of corruption, because they are particularly dependent on public goods.” 
EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
the risk that their activities may contribute to human rights abuses by 
corrupt governments in the countries in which they operate. The EITI 
is a set of reporting standards published by a coalition of companies, 
governments, and NGOs.50 
How We Work, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/about/how- 
we-work (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
It requires companies to disclose payments 
to governments and governments to disclose the amounts that they 
receive from these sources.51 
Guide to Implementing the EITI Standard, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, 
https://eiti.org/guide (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
Recent revisions require disclosure of pay-
ment information by individual project.52 
Project-Level Reporting in the Extractive Industries, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY 
INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/document/projectlevel-reporting-in-extractive-industries (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2019). 
Adoption of the EITI stand-
ard is discretionary, and implementation is the responsibility of 
individual countries that subscribe to it. As a result, the EITI require-
ments must be adopted into national law so that the extractive compa-
nies that operate within the country are subject to it. National laws or 
regulations and the process for certifying them are independently vali-
dated by the EITI before the country is deemed to be EITI compliant, 
and countries must maintain adherence to all the EITI rules in order to 
retain their compliant status. The EITI currently has designated thirty- 
one countries as compliant, which includes Kazakhstan, Peru, and a sig-
nificant number of African countries.53 
Implementation Status, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/ 
countries (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
The United States, however, 
withdrew in November 2017 as an “implementing country” under the 
EITI, on the ground that it is unable to comply with all its require-
ments.54 
Bill Chappell, US Withdraws from Anti-Corruption Group’s Oil and Petroleum Rules, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Nov. 3, 2017, 3:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/03/ 
561908947/u-s-withdraws-from-anti-corruption-oil-and-petroleum-group. 
The United States stated that it would remain one of seventeen 
“supporting countries” of the EITI.55 Compliant countries must seek 
revalidation every three years.56   
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
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Broader reporting requirements are contained in provisions such as 
the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive57 and the U.K. Companies 
Act.58 
Companies Act 2006, c.46 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ 
ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. 
The former requires that companies publish reports on the poli-
cies that they implement with respect to environmental protection, 
social responsibility and treatment of employees, respect for human 
rights, anti-corruption and bribery, and diversity on company boards in 
terms of age, gender, and educational and professional background.59 
The U.K. Companies Act requires companies to issue a Strategic 
Report “to inform members of the company and help them assess how 
the directors have performed their duty . . . to promote the success of 
the company.”60 
The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, SI 
2013/1970, art. 3, ¶ 414C(1) (Eng.) https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1970/pdfs/ 
uksi_20131970_en.pdf. 
It provides that a company listed on a stock exchange 
“must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the develop-
ment, performance or position of the company’s business,” include in 
its Report: 
information about— 
(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the com-
pany’s business on the environment), 
(ii) the company’s employees, and 
(iii) social, community issues, and human rights issues, including 
information about any policies of the company in relation to 
those matters and the effectiveness of those policies.61 
The Guidance Report on the Act issued by the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) has clarified that the Act mandates disclosures that 
relate to information that is material.62 
Guidance on the Strategic Report, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (July 2018), https://www.frc.org. 
uk/getattachment/fb05dd7b-c76c-424e-9daf-4293c9fa2d6a/Guidance-on-the-Strategic-Report- 
31-7-18.pdf. 
In addition, the agency has 
opined that it “does not believe that it would be best practice for an 
unquoted company to prepare a strategic report which omitted, for 
example, information on a material human rights issue simply because 
57. Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
Amending Directive 2013/34 EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity 
Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L330) 1. 
58. 
59. Directive 2014/95/EU, supra note 57. 
60. 
61. Id. ¶ 414C(7)(b). 
62. 
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there was no explicit legal or regulatory requirement to address such 
matters.”63 
C. Ring Three: Legal Responsibility for Process 
The third ring of the Galaxy imposes legal responsibility for taking 
steps to identify and minimize foreseeable harms from business opera-
tions. The common law duty of care and the French statutory duty of 
vigilance can be seen as occupying this ring. The Child Labor Due 
Diligence Law in the Netherlands also can be seen as occupying this 
ring. It requires a company registered in the Netherlands, or that deliv-
ers goods or services to the Netherlands twice or more a year, to make a 
one-time disclosure of the due diligence it has undertaken to deter-
mine if child labor is occurring in its supply chain.64 
Frequently Asked Questions about the new Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law, MVO PLATFORM 
(Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.mvoplatform.nl/en/frequently-asked-questions-about-the-new- 
dutch-child-labour-due-diligence-law/. 
Any company that 
learns that there is a reasonable presumption that child labor is being 
used in its supply chain is expected to prepare an action plan to prevent 
this.65 
Two features of the common law duty of care make it an especially 
useful source of guidance in interpreting the requirements of the new 
French statutory duty and of due diligence requirements such as set 
forth in the Netherlands law.66 First, requirements of the duty of care 
are sensitive to context, which provides the flexibility to take into 
account a range of considerations. This is useful in light of the wide va-
riety of business organizations and the diverse nature of their opera-
tions. Second, the duty of care occupies an intermediate place in the 
Galaxy between enforceable and non-enforceable norms. It constitutes 
an enforceable obligation to anticipate and take precautions against 
risks, which is framed in broad and open-ended terms. This means that 
the task of determining the steps necessary to fulfill the duty may draw 
guidance from norms in other rings of the Galaxy, especially if they 
address specific types of risks. 
63. Id. at 89-90. 
64. 
65. Id. 
66. See, e.g., Beatrice Parance & Elise Groulx, Regards croise´s sur le devoir de vigilance et le duty of 
care [Comparative law analysis of Duty of vigilance and Duty of Care], 145 JOURNAL DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 21 (2018) (Fr.); Claire Bright, Le devoir de diligence de la socie´te´ me`re dans la 
jurisprudence anglaise [The duty of diligence of the parent corporation in English jurisprudence], DROIT 
SOCIAL 828 (2017) (Fr.); Sandra Cossart et al., The French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step 
Towards Making Globalisation Work for All, 2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 317 (2017). 
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The responsabilite´ civile quasi-de´lictuelle (tort liability) in French law is 
equivalent to tort law in common law countries. The French liability is 
built around the standard of the reasonable person. The threshold 
requirement is that an actor has a duty of care to those affected by his 
or her actions.67 If this duty exists, she or he may be liable when her/his 
negligence causes injury to others.68 The existence of a duty and its obli-
gations are assessed on a case-by-case basis, with case law clarifying their 
boundaries. 
Human rights lawyer and scholar Douglass Cassel has noted the 
dynamic character of the common law duty of care, which evolves 
according to what is “fair, just, and reasonable, in accordance with 
community expectations and common sense, and reflective of alter-
ing social conditions and standards.”69 U.K. law provides a useful 
example of the elements of this duty.70 As declared in the 1990 House 
of Lords—now Supreme Court—case of Caparo Industries Plc v. 
Dickman, its existence and scope is subject to three requirements: 
(1) foreseeability, (2) proximity, and (3) the fairness and reasonable-
ness of imposing a duty.71 
The foreseeability element asks whether a reasonable person would 
have foreseen that injury would occur from her actions or omissions.72 
Proximity requires that there be a sufficiently close relationship 
between the victim and the person who caused the injury.73 The fair-
ness and reasonableness element incorporates elements from the other 
two requirements: the more foreseeable the consequences and closer 
the relationship, the more likely that it is fair and reasonable to find 
that an actor had a duty of care. This step also requires consideration of 
whether any public policy concerns should prevent or limit the imposi-
tion of a duty. The duty of care under a reasonable person standard 
thus is a behavioral standard akin to an obligation de moyens (an obliga-
tion to provide the means) to prevent liability. 
67. PHILIPPE BRUN, RESPONSABILITE´ CIVILE EXTRA-CONTRACTUELLE [EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL CIVIL 
LIABILITY] 292 (5th ed. 2018) (Fr.). 
68. CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS ¶¶ 8-01 to 8-214 (21st ed. 2014). 
69. Douglas Cassel, Outlining the Case for a Common Law Duty of Care of Business to Exercise Human 
Rights Due Diligence, 1 BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS J. 179, 189 (2016). 
70. Professor Cassel has provided a thorough analysis of the ways in which formulations of a 
duty of care may formally diverge among common law jurisdictions, but he acknowledges that it is 
not clear that these differences lead to significantly different results. See id. at 189-95. 
71. Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman, [1990] 2 AC 605, 617-18 (HL) (Eng.). 
72. Id. at 640. 
73. Id. at 617-18. 
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To date, common law jurisdictions have not recognized a general 
duty of parent companies to take steps to minimize the risks of harm 
inflicted by subsidiaries or suppliers, such as the French law requires.74 
Such a step is distinct from a willingness in some cases to “pierce the 
corporate veil” in cases on the ground that a subsidiary does not have a 
meaningful independent legal identity and the parent company is 
using it to commit a wrong.75 
Courts in the United Kingdom and Canada have accepted the possi-
bility, however, of imposing liability on parent corporations for the 
actions of subsidiaries in circumstances involving conduct by the parent 
that creates expectations with respect to its responsibility. In Chandler v. 
Cape, for example, a victim suffering from asbestosis, and who had 
worked in the asbestos plant of one of Cape’s subsidiaries no longer in 
existence, filed suit against the parent company for damages for his 
injury.76 The tribunal recognized a duty of care owed by the parent 
company to the employee, applying the criteria established in Caparo v. 
Dickman.77 
The court stated: 
The configuration of the asbestos factory dated back to the 
time when Cape introduced its Pluto board manufacturing 
business into the Cowley Works. By installing its business there, 
it must have implicitly undertaken a duty of care to ensure that 
its business was carried on without risk to the employees in the 
other business of Cape Products carried on at the Cowley 
Works. In due course, it required Cape to purchase this 
business.78 
The court continued, “Cape moreover had superior knowledge 
about the asbestos business. It was in a substantial way of business and 
74. See Cassel, supra note 69, at 181. 
75. Adams v. Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA) (Eng.). In this opinion, the English 
Court of Appeal had to assess which circumstances would allow lifting the corporate veil over 
Cape’s subsidiaries, thus ignoring the subsidiaries’ autonomy. While, in the case at hand, the Court 
of Appeal ruled that the circumstances for lifting the veil were not met and that the subsidiary was 
to remain distinct from the parent company, the court enumerated three alternative criteria which 
would allow for lifting the social veil of a subsidiary: (i) whether the subsidiary is fictitious, 
(ii) whether the company constitutes a unique economic entity, and (iii) the mandate. This basis 
for liability is not, however, the focus of this Article. 
76. Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525 [1], 1 WLR 3111 (Eng.). 
77. Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (Eng.). 
78. Chandler, EWCA Civ 525 [75]. 
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its resources far exceeded those of Cape Products. Dr. Smither was 
doing research into the link between asbestos dust and asbestosis and 
related diseases.”79 Moreover, the court said, letters within the company 
provided “clear evidence of Cape involving itself in issues relevant to 
health and safety policy at Cape Products, for example whether an em-
ployee diagnosed as having asbestosis could continue to be employed 
in that business.”80 The court concluded: 
Given Cape’s state of knowledge about the Cowley Works, and 
its superior knowledge about the nature and management of 
asbestos risks, I have no doubt that in this case it is appropriate 
to find that Cape assumed a duty of care either to advise Cape 
Products on what steps it had to take in the light of knowledge 
then available to provide those employees with a safe system of 
work or to ensure that those steps were taken.81 
Canadian case law has also recognized the possibility of a direct duty 
of a parent corporation with respect to alleged human rights violations 
by a subsidiary. In Choc v. Hubday Minerals Inc., the Ontario Superior 
Court denied a motion to dismiss a claim against a Canadian mining 
company based on security forces’ murder, physical assault, and rape of 
members of local communities living near the operations of one of its 
subsidiaries in Guatemala.82 The defendant claimed that “there is no 
recognized duty of care owed by a parent company to ensure that the 
commercial activities carried on by its subsidiary in a foreign country 
are conducted in a manner designed to protect those people with 
whom the subsidiary interacts,”83 and that “a parent corporation cannot 
be responsible for the actions of its subsidiary.”84 
The court said that the standard for dismissal is that it is “‘plain and 
obvious’ that a claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and will 
fail.”85 It acknowledged that a direct negligence claim against a parent 
company for the actions of its subsidiary was novel, but concluded that 
the plaintiffs had pled facts that, if proven, could support a claim 
that the injury was reasonably foreseeable, that there was sufficient 
79. Id. 
80. Id. ¶ 76. 
81. Id. ¶ 78. 
82. Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., [2013] ONSC 1414 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
83. Id. ¶ 18. 
84. Id. ¶ 19. 
85. Id. ¶ 55. 
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proximity between the parties to impose a duty of care, and that there 
were no public policy concerns militating against finding a duty.86 
With respect to foreseeability, the court noted that, inter alia, the par-
ent company knew that violence frequently was used by security forces 
during eviction and had been used in the past; security personnel were 
unlicensed, inadequately trained, and possessed unlicensed and illegal 
firearms; and that “in general there was a risk that violence and rape 
could occur.”87 The court thus concluded that, if the alleged facts were 
proven, it would have been “reasonably foreseeable” to the parent com-
pany that “authorizing the use of force in response to peaceful opposi-
tion from the local community could lead to the security personnel 
committing violent acts.”88 
With regard to the proximity of the relationship, the court noted the 
claim that the parent company had made repeated public statements 
that it was making efforts to address conflicts over land in connection 
with its projects, that it was committed to working with local groups to 
resolve such conflicts, and that the company had adopted the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for its security 
forces.89 The court also observed that plaintiffs alleged that parent com-
pany executives and employees assumed direct responsibility for opera-
tions relating to land issues.90 
Finally, the court stated that the case presented competing policy 
considerations that would be best considered with the benefit of a full 
record, which meant that it was not “plain and obvious” that such con-
siderations supported a motion to dismiss.91 
One aspect of the dynamism of the common law duty of care that is 
especially relevant to norms in other rings of the Business and Human 
Rights Galaxy is the tendency of courts to look to compliance with com-
mon industry practice as probative of whether the duty has been satis-
fied.92 As the court noted in Trimarco v. Klein, 
86. Id. ¶ 65. 
87. Id. ¶ 64. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. ¶ 67. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. ¶ 74. 
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §13 (AM. LAW INST., 
Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (noting the influence of custom as a source of legal obligation 
and in tort law as the test of “ordinary care”); See generally Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, 
The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553 (2005). 
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[W]hen proof of an accepted practice is accompanied by evi-
dence that the defendant conformed to it, this may establish 
due care and, contrariwise, when proof of a customary practice 
is coupled with a showing that it was ignored and that this de-
parture was a proximate cause of the accident, it may serve to 
establish liability.93 
Additionally, in a very recent, long expected, decision in the case 
of Vedanta, the U.K. Supreme Court affirmed the potential liability of 
multinational corporations for harms perpetrated through the acts 
of a subsidiary and approved respondents’/claimants’ petition for 
their case to move forward on the merits.94 This tort case arises from 
alleged toxic emissions from the Nchanga Copper Mine in the 
Chingola District of Zambia, affecting upwards of 1,500 people.95 
Discussing at length the duty of care of a parent company to third 
parties harmed by its subsidiaries, and the notion of substantial jus-
tice with regard to forum non-conveniens, the decision has far-reaching 
implications for extraterritorial activity undertaken by multinational 
corporations primarily through its subsidiaries. 
While the court indicated that the appeal dealt only with the issue of 
jurisdiction, the discussion on the existence of a duty of care of a parent 
company is lengthy. Noting that “the liability of parent companies in 
relation to the activities of their subsidiaries is not, of itself, a distinct 
category of liability in common law negligence,” the Court stated that 
“everything depends on the extent to which, and the way in which, the 
parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in, con-
trol, supervise or advise the management of the relevant operations 
(including land use) of the subsidiary.”96 In this, the court noted that 
just as the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship does not ipso 
facto indicate an obligation or responsibility of the parent company,97 
the court is also “not persuaded that there is any such reliable limiting 
principle.”98 Existing corporate guidelines about minimizing the social 
and environmental impact of inherently dangerous activities, such as 
mining, may very well implicate a duty of care if the parent companies 
93. Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98, 105-06 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982). 
94. Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe, [2019] UKSC 20 (UK). 
95. Id. ¶ 1. Further, claimants allege that their health and farming activities have been 
damaged by repeated discharges of toxic matter from the Nchanga Copper Mine into those 
watercourses from 2005 to date. 
96. Id. ¶ 49. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. ¶ 52. 
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hold themselves out to supervise implementation.99 Further, when 
examining the contours of the application of the duty of care the U.K. 
Supreme Court noted three examples where the parent company could 
incur liability: 
(1) Where it has set down group guidelines which contain sys-
temic errors that cause harm to third parties;100  
(2) 
 
Where it has taken active steps to implement guidelines in 
the operations of its subsidiary;101 and  
(3) Where it has represented that it has relevant degree of 
supervision and control (even where it does not in fact).102 
Similarly, in Garthe v. Ruppert the New York Court of Appeals stated 
that when “certain dangers have been removed by a customary way of 
doing things safely, this custom may be proved to show that [the one 
charged with a breach of care] has fallen below the required 
standard.”103 
Courts do not, however, treat compliance with industry custom as dis-
positive evidence of compliance with a duty of care, in light of the fact 
that companies in an industry may not have been willing to take suffi-
cient steps to prevent foreseeable harm from their activities.104 As two 
authors note, “[c]ustom provides the floor, but not necessarily the ceil-
ing, of reasonable care.”105 
Furthermore, a practice need not be universal or ubiquitous to serve 
as a standard for satisfying a duty of care. In the notable case of The T.J. 
Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., for example, Judge Learned Hand of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second held that tugboats were negligent 
in not using radio sets that could have warned them of weather condi-
tions that resulted in the loss of barges carrying cargo of the plain-
tiffs.106 Judge Hand acknowledged, “It is not fair to say that there was a 
general custom among coastwise carriers so to equip their tugs. One 
line alone did it; as for the rest, they relied upon their crews, so far as  
99. Id. ¶ 53. 
100. Id. ¶ 52. 
101. Id. ¶ 53. 
102. Id. 
103. Garthe v. Ruppert, 264 N.Y. 290, 296 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1934). 
104. The T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
105. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1588 (2005). 
106. See Hooper, 60 F.2d at 737. 
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they can be said to have relied at all.”107 Thus, “here there was no cus-
tom at all as to receiving sets; some had them, some did not; the most 
that can be urged is that they had not yet become general.”108 
Nonetheless, declared Judge Hand, “Courts must in the end say what 
is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their univer-
sal disregard will not excuse their omission.” In this case: 
An adequate receiving set suitable for a coastwise tug can now 
be got at small cost and is reasonably reliable if kept up; obvi-
ously it is a source of great protection to their tows. Twice every 
day they can receive these predictions, based upon the widest 
possible information, available to every vessel within two or 
three hundred miles and more. Such a set is the ears of the tug 
to catch the spoken word, just as the master’s binoculars are 
her eyes to see a storm signal ashore.109 
The Second Circuit therefore concluded that “had [the tugboats] 
been properly equipped, they would have got the [weather] reports. 
The injury was a direct consequence of this un-seaworthiness.”110 
Torts scholar Richard Epstein suggests that customary practice 
should be given the most weight in cases involving parties who interact 
in a market or trade, such as merchants.111 With respect to outsiders, 
however, liability should be based on a cost-benefit analysis: “whether 
the defendant took all cost-justified precautions against the occurrence 
of the harm.” This requires an assessment of “the likelihood that the 
defendant’s conduct will result in harm, the expected severity of that 
harm, and the cost of avoiding the occurrence.”112 
Finally, industry practice may also be probative not simply of whether 
a duty has been breached, but whether it existed in the first place. 
Based on the logic of the T.J. Hooper case, for instance, a court might 
use adherence by most companies in an industry to a private voluntary 
standard on monitoring working conditions in certain tiers of the sup-
ply chain as an indication that companies in the industry have assumed 
a duty to workers in those tiers. A company that was not a signatory to 
the standard could be deemed to have such a duty despite its failure to 
107. Id. at 739. 
108. Id. at 740. 
109. Id. at 739-40. 
110. Id. at 740. 
111. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of 
Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992). 
112. Id. at 1. 
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join the agreement because of the general expectations that the stand-
ard has created.113 The company could then be held in breach of the 
duty if its supply chain diligence is less rigorous than the standard. 
D. Ring Four: Private Voluntary Initiatives 
The fourth ring of norms includes private voluntary standards and 
codes of conduct that may be formulated by individual companies or 
businesses in a particular sector, sometimes in concert with labor organ-
izations and NGOs. In the apparel industry, for instance, several private 
organizations in the United States and Europe have established their 
own set of voluntary standards and have attempted to persuade major 
companies to agree to adhere to their programs.114 Such programs dif-
fer with respect to features such as the labor standards they contain, the 
procedures for implementing commitment to those standards, the pro-
cess of monitoring implementation, and the range of stakeholders 
involved in the process.115 One scholar reports that the labor require-
ments of an increasing number of programs follow ILO standards.116 
Id. at 162. Most provisions of the ILO Conventions are not regarded as self-executing and 
therefore constitute “soft law” in Ring Five. As one source states, “[i]n case of ratification, ILO 
conventions have the same impact for Member States as treaties have under international law: 
they are under an obligation to implement these rules, whereas the mode of incorporation of 
ILO standards into domestic law is governed by the different domestic legal systems themselves. 
Depending on the domestic status of ILO conventions and, foremost, on the wording of the 
respective norm, i.e. whether a provision is self-executing, ILO conventions may be relied upon in 
national courts. . . . In fact, ILO standards are frequently formulated as programmatic norms, 
putting an obligation upon governments to pursue a certain policy, without granting individual 
parties the right to invoke the provision in court.” Keiko Sauer, International Labour Organization 
(ILO), OXFORD PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 13 (Aug. 2014), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/ 
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e490. 
The standards in these programs are not imposed by public law, but 
suppliers in a company’s supply chain agree by contract to adhere 
to them.117 Companies typically hire third-party audit firms to moni- 
tor and certify compliance.118 The failure of a supplier to obtain 
113. There is a famous French case in which the Cassation Court recognized Total’s civil 
liability following an oil spill, as the company did not comply with the internal safety procedures it 
had adopted, when choosing to transport fuel oil on the MV Erika. Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Sept. 25, 2012, Bull. crim., No. 10-82.938 (Fr.). 
114. See LUC FRANSEN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL LABOR STANDARDS 
(2012). 
115. See generally id. 
116. 
117. Sauer, supra note 114, ¶ 13. 
118. SHIFT PROJECT, FROM AUDIT TO INNOVATION: ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL SUPPLY 
CHAINS (Aug. 2013). 
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certification may then be the basis for termination by an apparel com-
pany.119 In this way, voluntary standards adopted by major companies 
may constitute a private enforcement scheme when they are incorpo-
rated into contractual requirements. 
One example of a private program in the apparel sector is the 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, created after the col-
lapse of a factory building in Bangladesh in 2013 that claimed more 
than 1,100 lives.120
ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, https://bangladeshaccord.org/ 
about (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
 Some 190 global brands and retailers and unions in 
the ready-to-wear garment industry are parties to the agreement.121 
Companies disclose under the Accord all factories in Bangladesh where 
their garments are manufactured.122 Participants have established 
building standards that are designed to “establish a common set of min-
imum requirements that provide a uniform and effective method for 
assessing fire and building structural safety in new and existing ready-
made garment factories used by Accord suppliers.”123 The results of 
these inspections are made public, and factories that fall short of stand-
ards file a plan to remedy substandard conditions.124 The Accord pro-
vides that brands must “negotiate commercial terms with their 
suppliers which ensure that it is financially feasible for the factories to 
maintain safe workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation 
requirements.”125 
Marc Bain, The International Effort to Fix Bangladesh’s Deadly Factories Has a Basic Math Problem, 
QUARTZ (July 5, 2017), https://qz.com/1018430/the-international-effort-to-fix-bangladeshs-deadly- 
factories-has-a-basic-math-problem/. 
There is some concern, however, about the extent to 
which adequate funding has been available.126 The program also 
involves safety training for joint management and labor committees, 
and a mechanism for workers to file complaints about substandard 
conditions.127 
Abuses by security forces providing services for business operations 
in zones of conflict and weak governance prompted the creation of the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for the extractive  
119. Id. 
120. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, ALLIANCE FIRE SAFETY AND 
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY STANDARD V 1.1, PART 1 §1.3 (2014). 
124. Id. 
125. 
126. Id. 
127. 
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Workplace Programs, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, https:// 
bangladeshaccord.org/workers (last visited May 30, 2019). 
industry.128 
VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary- 
principles/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
Companies signing on to the Principles commit to obey the 
laws of the host state, “to be mindful of the highest applicable interna-
tional standards, and to promote the observance of applicable interna-
tional law enforcement principles . . . particularly with regard to the use 
of force.”129 The Principles provide guidance with respect to risk assess-
ments of doing business in weak governance or conflict zones, as well as 
contractual relationships with public and private security forces.130 
The Principles also state that private security providers should pro-
vide only preventive and defensive services, and should not engage in 
activities that are the exclusive responsibilities of state military or law 
enforcement authorities.131 Companies are encouraged to incorporate 
the Principles into their contracts with private security personnel,132 
and to provide for contractual authority to terminate services upon 
credible evidence of unlawful or abusive behavior by private security 
personnel. Finally, both public and private security providers are 
expected not to interfere with fundamental labor rights protected 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the 
ILO Declaration.133 
Governments, extractive companies, and NGOs may become mem-
bers of the Voluntary Principles Initiative.134 The participation criteria 
explicitly state that the Principles do not create legally binding stand-
ards and specifically rule out the possibility of legal enforcement by 
third parties alleging human rights abuses.135 
Another sector in which voluntary principles have become influential 
is financial institutions. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
is a member of the World Bank Group that makes financing available 
for private investment in countries developing.136 
IFC, https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_ 
site/home (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
Its Performance 
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability are measures 
that companies must adopt in order to qualify for funding.137 
IFC, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 1 (Jan. 1, 
2012), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/115482804a0255db96fbffd1a5d13d27/PS_English_ 
2012_Full-Document.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
The eight 
128. 
129. Id. 
130. VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES, supra note 129, at Risk Assessment. 
131. Id. at Interactions Between Companies and Private Security. 
132. Id. 
133. VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES, supra note 131, at Deployment and Conduct. 
134. Id. at Introduction. 
135. Id. 
136. 
137. 
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Standards “provide[e] guidance on how to identify risks and impacts, 
and are designed to help avoid, mitigate, and manage risks and impacts 
as a way of doing business in a sustainable way.”138 
The Standards focus on risks to the environment, health, working 
conditions, and involuntary resettlement, but do not include a standard 
devoted specifically to human rights. The IFC has stated, however, that 
“[e]ach of the Performance Standards has elements related to human 
rights dimensions that a project may face in the course of its operations. 
Due diligence against these Performance Standards will enable the cli-
ent to address many relevant human rights issues in its project.”139 The 
Standards do say that “[i]n limited high risk circumstances, it may be 
appropriate for the client to complement its environmental and social 
risks and impacts identification process with specific human rights due 
diligence as relevant to the particular business.”140 The IFC indicates 
that its approach to assessing and managing environmental and social 
risks is “broadly convergent” with the U.N. Guiding Principles.141 
IFC, U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND IFC SUSTAINABILITY 
FRAMEWORK, 1, http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c3dedb0049c51e71886d99da80c2ddf3/ 
UNGPsandIFC-SF-DRAFT.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
Importantly, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Jam et. Al. v. 
International Finance Corp142 has restricted the grant of immunity 
awarded to the IFC, bringing it in line with that awarded to foreign gov-
ernments, which, in theory, increases liability and accountability.143 
The Equator Principles (EPs) are characterized by its signatories as 
“a risk management framework adopted by financial institutions for 
determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risk in 
projects being considered for financing.”144 
EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, https://equator-principles.com/about/ (last visited May 26, 2019). 
It is primarily intended “to 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 3. 
140. Id. at 7 n.12. 
141. 
142. Jam et al. v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759 (2019). 
143. In the recent decision regarding Jam v. IFC, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, holding that international organizations no 
longer enjoy absolute immunity, but are subject the same commercial activity exception to which 
foreign governments must adhere. What the Court’s opinion did not address is potentially more 
interesting, namely the question of where the line between commercial activity, and necessary 
development, lies. However, internal critiques and changes to the CAO, the ombudsmen of the 
IFC, remain the primary anticipated consequence of the decision. For more regarding the 
workings of the CAO see Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Daniel Bradlow in Support of Plaintiffs- 
Appellants at 12, Jam v. Int’l. Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-cv-00612). For 
legal context of the Court’s decision, see Anthony Cooper, Jam v. International Finance 
Corporation: Access to Remedy but Only When We Say So, 26 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 417 (2018). 
144. 
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provide a minimum standard for due diligence and monitoring to sup-
port responsible risk decision-making by the banking sector.”145 The 
Principles were adopted in 2003 by a group of ten project finance 
banks, and are linked to IFC performance standards for the social and 
environmental sustainability of projects.146 
EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (June 2013), https://equator-principles. 
com./wp-content/uploads/2017/03/equator_principles_III.pdf. 
The preamble states that 
the aim of the Principles is to ensure that projects financed by the fi-
nancial institutions that adopt them “are developed in a manner that is 
socially responsible and reflects sound environmental management 
practices.”147 As with the IFC Performance Standards, the Principles do 
not explicitly address human rights except insofar as environmental or 
social impacts that are the focus of the Principles may have a bearing 
on them. 
The Principles apply to all industry sectors and to four financial 
products: (1) Project Finance Advisory Services, (2) Project Finance, 
(3) Project-Related Corporate Loans, and (4) Bridge Loans.148 Currently, 
“96 Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) in 37 countries have 
officially adopted the Principles, covering the majority of international 
project finance debt within developed and emerging markets.”149 
About The Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, https://equator-principles.com/about/ 
(last accessed May 30, 2019). 
Furthermore, multilateral development banks, including the European 
Bank for Reconstruction & Development, and export credit agencies 
through the OECD Common Approaches are increasingly drawing 
on the same standards as the EPs.”150 Institutions committed to the 
Principles agree not to provide services to projects that do not comply 
with them. 
The Principles require institutions to place a project in one of three 
categories based on its environmental and social impacts according to 
the IFC social and environmental criteria.151 
Category A includes projects “with potential significant adverse envi-
ronmental and social risks and/or impacts that are diverse, irreversible, 
or unprecedented.”152 Category B includes projects with “potential 
145. Id. 
146. 
147. Id. at 2. 
148. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 1, 3. (June 2013). 
149. 
150. Id. 
151. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 147, at 1, 6 (June 2013). Of note, the Equator Principles 
require compliance with IFC standards in “Non-Designated Countries,” instead deferring to host 
country laws and regulations when undertaking projects in “Designated Countries.” 
152. Id. at 5. 
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limited adverse environmental and social risks and/or impacts that 
are few in number, generally site-specific, largely reversible, and read-
ily addressed through addressed through mitigation measures.”153 
Finally, projects in Category C are those with “minimal or no adverse 
environmental and social risks and/or impacts.”154 Projects in 
Category A are subject to the most demanding requirements, while 
those in Categories B and C are respectively subject to decreasing 
demands.155 
The Equator Principles are privately developed standards to which 
financial institutions voluntarily agree to adhere.156 This “soft” fea-
ture of the Principles, however, takes on a “hard” edge for borrowers 
that must comply with the requirements of the Principles in order to 
obtain funding for projects.157 This constraint becomes even more 
stringent as other public and private financial institutions incorpo-
rate the Principles into their own lending standards.158 
EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, EP ASSOCIATION MEMBERS & REPORTING (2019), https://equator- 
principles.com/members-reporting/. 
The Thun Group represents another set of financial institutions 
that has issued two reports on the implications of the UNGPs, reflect-
ing thoughts on what the Guiding Principles “might mean for banks 
in practice and initial guidance to banks keen to address human 
rights issues in their core business activities – both to minimise poten-
tial adverse impacts to rights holders and related risks to banks, and 
to identify opportunities to promote good practice.”159 The Group’s 
second report in 2017 purports to define when bank activity is 
“directly linked” to an adverse human rights impact under UNGP 
Principle 13.160   
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 11. 
157. Id. at 9. 
158. 
159. THE THUN GROUP OF BANKS, U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCUSSION PAPER FOR BANKS ON IMPLICATIONS OF PRINCIPLES 16–21 at 3 (2013); see also THE THUN 
GROUP OF BANKS, DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES 13 & 17 IN 
A CORPORATE AND INVESTMENT BANKING CONTEXT (2017). 
160. 
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THUN GROUP (2017), supra note 156, at 3. For a criticism of the Group’s approach to 
responsibility for adverse human rights impacts, see John Ruggie, Comments on Thun Group of 
Banks Discussion Paper on the Implications of UN Guiding Principles 13 & 17 In a Corporate and 
Investment Banking Context, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.ihrb.org/uploads/ 
submissions/John_Ruggie_Comments_Thun_Banks_Feb_2017.pdf. 
The influence of the UNGPs is reflected in the Fe´de´ration 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) embrace of the UNGP.161 
FIFA Executive Committee Sets Presidential Election for 26 February 2016, FIFA (July 20, 2015), 
https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/fifa-executive-committee-sets-presidential- 
election-for-26-february-20-2666448. 
The organization’s human rights policy indicates that it is “commit-
ted to respecting human rights in accordance with the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).”162 
FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, FIFA, at 5 (2017), https://resources.fifa.com/mm/ 
document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/12/fifashumanrightspolicy_neutral. 
pdf. 
FIFA has 
stated that the standards in its policy apply to “FIFA subsidiaries, 
FIFA-recognized regional football confederations, FIFA member 
associations, entities tasked with organizing FIFA competitions, 
FIFA’s commercial affiliates, service providers and suppliers, as well 
as other entities that are linked to FIFA through its business relation-
ships.”163 FIFA’s policy reflects its response to recommendations set 
forth in a report by John Ruggie, the leading participant in the draft-
ing of the UNGPs.164 
John G. Ruggie, “For the Game. For the World.” FIFA and Human Rights, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. 
(2016), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Ruggie_humanrightsFIFA_reportApril
2016.pdf
 
. 
Ruggie and John Sherman suggest that this step 
by FIFA indicates that the UNGPs “are adding significant human 
rights punch to private law of contracts, the new lex mercatoria, whose 
global reach and enforceability can affect workplace conditions, the 
welfare of communities, and environmental practices worldwide.”165 
Finally, what are known as International Framework Agreements are 
another form of standards that occupy the fourth ring. These are agree-
ments on labor conditions between Multinational Companies (MNCs) 
and Global Union Federations (GUFs) that commit MNCs to abide by 
core international labor standards across all their operations.166 All 
agreements incorporate the core ILO Conventions and the ILO’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at work.167 As Brian 
Burkett notes, “The most recent generation of IFAs are noteworthy in 
terms of expanding the accountability of corporations in their human 
rights footprint by; (1) extending the scope of the IFAs to include 
161. 
162. 
163. Id. at 4. 
164. 
165. John Gerard Ruggie & John F. Sherman, III, Adding Human Rights Punch to the New Lex 
Mercatoria: The Impact of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights on Commercial Legal 
Practice, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 455, 456 (2015). 
166. Brian Burkett, Globalization in Transition: A Canadian Perspective, 21 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
420-421 (2019). 
167. Id. at 420. 
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“business partners,” including suppliers, contractors and producers of 
the MNCs; and (2) by transferring “decisional power in respect of dis-
putes over human rights violations to a third party, including the ILO 
itself.”168 
E. Ring Five: International Soft Law 
The final ring of norms is comprised of what traditionally has been 
called “soft law.” These are non-binding declarations, guiding princi-
ples, and frameworks set forth in international covenants or instru-
ments published by international organizations.169 Examples are the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two human rights cove-
nants ratified pursuant to it (International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights);170 the UNGPs on Business and Human Rights;171 
U.N. High Comm’r of H. R., Guiding Principle on Business and Human Rights, U.N. (2011), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises;172 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
inv/mne/48004323.pdf. 
the U.N. Global 
Compact;173 
The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www. 
unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
and eight international conventions that the ILO regards 
as fundamental: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, Forced Labor, 
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, Minimum Age, Worst Forms of 
Child Labor, Equal Remuneration, and Discrimination in Employment 
and Occupation.174 
Conventions and Recommendations. Labour Standards, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/global/ 
standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/ 
lang-en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
There are also several additional conventions on a 
variety of topics, as well as recommendations by the ILO.175 
Introduction to International Labour Standards. Labour Standards, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/ 
global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/lang-en/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
As we have 
mentioned, the UNGPs state that businesses have a responsibility to 
respect human rights as expressed in the UDHR and its two implement-
ing covenants, as well as the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental 
168. Id. at 421. 
169. See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 171 
(2010). 
170. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 1976 U.N.T.S. 4. 
171. 
172. 
173. 
174. 
175. 
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Principles and Rights at Work. Over the years the soft law norms of the 
OECD, the ILO, and the U.N. have become increasingly integrated. 
An example of reliance on these sources of standards is the new 
Netherlands Child Labor Due Diligence statute finally adopted by the 
Dutch Senate in Amsterdam, on the 14th of May 2019.176 That law suggests 
the companies conducting due diligence to determine if child labor is 
occurring in their supply chains refer to the process set forth in the Child 
Labour Guidance for Business prepared by the International Labor 
Organization in collaboration with the International Organization of 
Employers.177 
Id.; see INT’L LAB. ORG., ILO-IOE CHILD LABOUR GUIDANCE TOOL FOR BUSINESS: HOW TO 
DO BUSINESS WITH RESPECT FOR CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM CHILD LABOUR (2015), 
http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/download.do?type=document&id=27555. 
That document in turn relies substantially on the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.178 
IV. GRAVITATIONAL FORCES IN THE GALAXY 
In this section, we discuss how norms in various rings of the Business 
and Human Rights Galaxy have the potential to influence norms in 
other rings. The European Directive on Non-Financial Reporting, for 
instance, requires large companies to file a “non-financial statement 
containing information relating to at least environmental matters, 
social and employee-related matters, respect for human rights, anti- 
corruption and bribery matters. Such statement should include a 
description of the policies, outcomes and risks related to those matters 
and should be included in the management report” of the company.179 
The statement “should also include information on the due diligence 
processes implemented by the undertaking, also regarding, where rele-
vant and proportionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in order 
to identify, prevent and mitigate existing and potential adverse 
impacts.”180 As we have indicated, the Directive thus is located in what 
we have described as the second ring of norms that involve reporting 
requirements. 
The Directive provides that companies may meet their obligations by 
drawing on norms contained in other rings of the Galaxy: 
176. See MVO PLATFORM, supra note 64. 
177. 
178. See id. at 9-23. 
179. Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2014 Amending Directive 2103/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-financial and Diversity 
Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 6. 
180. Id. 
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In providing this information, undertakings which are subject to 
this Directive may rely on national frameworks, Union-based 
frameworks such as the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS), or international frameworks such as the United Nations 
(UN) Global Compact, the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, the International Organisation for Standardisation’s 
ISO 26000, the International Labour Organisation’s Tripartite 
Declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises 
and social policy, the Global Reporting Initiative, or other recog-
nised international frameworks.181 
Similarly, the Guidance Report on the U.K. Companies Act issued by 
the FRC has said that in making disclosures on human rights issues, 
companies: 
[M]ay refer to a source of guidance (e.g. the UN Guiding 
Principles on Human Rights) or a voluntary framework that pro-
vides advice on how the entity should conduct its business, sug-
gests ways of monitoring or tracking performance, or provides 
examples of disclosures that might be helpful in communicat-
ing information to the entity’s stakeholders. In preparing the 
strategic report, the directors may choose to comply fully or 
partially with that guidance or voluntary framework, or take a 
more general regard of its content.182 
Guidance on the Strategic Report, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (2014), https://www.frc.org.uk/ 
accountants/accounting-and-reporting-policy/clear-and-concise-and-wider-corporate-reporting/ 
narrative-reporting/guidance-on-the-strategic-report. 
The FRC guidance thus provides another example of how “soft” 
standards, such as the UNGP, in the fifth ring of the Galaxy may be 
incorporated into company compliance with “hard” law requirements, 
such as reporting obligations, in the second ring. 
An example of a more targeted reporting requirement is the EU 
Accounting and Transparency Directives for the extractives and logging 
industries adopted in 2013.183 
Eur. Comm’n., Public Country by Country Reporting (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/info/ 
business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/public-country- 
country-reporting_en. (laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for European Union 
These provisions are modeled on the 
181. Id. ¶ 9. 
182. 
183. 
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importers of tin, tantalum, and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected 
and high-risk areas). 
Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and apply to all 
“listed and large non-listed companies that are active in the oil, gas, 
mining or logging sectors” that are either registered in the European 
Economic Area or listed on EU-regulated markets, even if they are 
incorporated in a non-European country.184 
The same EU Directives attempt to address corruption in the indus-
try by requiring these companies to report all material payments to gov-
ernments by country and project, including those for infrastructure 
improvements. The EU disclosure requirements apply directly to com-
panies rather than, as with the EITI, to individual countries.185 “These 
rules,” says the European Commission, “aim to improve the transpar-
ency of payments made to governments all over the world by the extrac-
tive and logging industries. This helps populations of resource-rich 
countries hold their governments accountable for the exploitation of 
natural resources, in line with the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative.”186 
In addition to the EITI, a major impetus for the EU initiative was the 
reporting requirement in Section 1504 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank legisla-
tion in the United States. That section requires resource extraction 
companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges to disclose all payments to 
governments by government entity, business segment making the pay-
ment, and individual project.187 This reflects one way in which an en-
forceable obligation may reflect the gravitational pull of both voluntary 
standards and hard law provisions in other countries. 
Another example of potential gravitational force is reporting require-
ments in the second ring of the Galaxy. These simply require disclosure 
of a company’s efforts and the process that it follows with regard to cer-
tain risks, rather than imposing enforceable substantive obligations. 
Consumers, investors, and NGOs, however, may use reports as a stand-
ard against which to evaluate company behavior. This could result in 
claims that the company is not living up to the commitments it 
describes in its reports, or that the reports misrepresent the company’s 
activities and thus create liability for fraud. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2018); Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 
Release No. 34-78167, 17 CFR Parts 240 and 249b (Sept. 26, 2016). 
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As one law firm has suggested, for instance, with respect to the 
California reporting requirement on supply chains, one risk for 
companies: 
[I]s a class action based on misleading disclosures—that is, 
false advertising. If your company complies with the statute but 
inaccurately describes its practices that could trigger a class 
action based on affirmative misrepresentation. Although it is 
debatable whether a plaintiff could win class certification on 
such a theory, the expense of such a suit—and the public rela-
tions damage—could be significant. So, it’s important to be 
careful about what you say.188 
Furthermore, “activists may push the envelope in litigation to try to 
find ways to use the statute without Attorney General involvement, or 
they may use extra-judicial methods to publicize violations.”189 The law 
firm suggests that as a result, “companies would be well advised both to 
have reasonable fair trade practices in place and, in complying with the 
statute, to disclose those practices accurately.”190 
In these ways, a reporting requirement may effectively subject a com-
pany to the expectation that it will minimize or eliminate human rights 
risks from its operations. Establishment and “enforcement” of this obli-
gation in this case thus may occur, not through the actions of a govern-
mental entity, but through the efforts of coalitions in civil society. 
Finally, the content of the hard law obligation of the duty of care con-
tained in the third ring of the Galaxy may be influenced by private vol-
untary norms in the fourth ring. Thus, for instance, a mining company 
that does not subscribe to the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights, or one that does so but does not train its security forces 
in accordance with them, could well be presumed to violate its duty 
unless it has adopted measures at least as stringent as these Principles. 
Patterns of influence such as these in the Business and Human 
Rights Galaxy reflect the fact that, in the absence of an international 
sovereign with regulatory authority over global corporate activities, 
transnational actors have increasingly looked to other forms of “law 
making” to regulate business operations.191 The aim is to provide what 
188. SHEPPARD MULLIN, supra note 45. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. See generally Hale & Held, supra note 28. 
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Niklas Luhmann calls “a social system which depends upon the congru-
ent generalisation of normative behavioral expectations.”192 
As our description indicates, the Business and Human Rights Galaxy 
has several distinctive features. First, as Jessica Green puts it, “the right to 
make rules is not restricted to states.”193 Instead, this right involves partic-
ipation by a range of both public and private actors, such as international 
organizations, NGOs, industry groups, professional organizations, and 
major corporations. Authority in the Galaxy—the gravitational force of a 
particular form of norm—arises not from formal legal enactments, but 
from the willingness of others to be bound by a party’s guidance. As 
Green argues, “when actors consent to be bound by rules, they create 
authority.”194 Such consent largely rests on the legitimacy of the actor, 
which in turn is based on qualities such as technical expertise, an inclu-
sive deliberative process, a dominant position in a relevant market, or 
perceived acceptance by other relevant actors. 
Second, rules and standards in the Galaxy develop in a range of less 
formal contexts than those in which traditional governmental regula-
tion occurs. Meetings convened by international organizations and 
NGOs, industry conferences, gatherings of professional associations, 
and informal communications among actors in various networks are all 
possible sites where ideas are proposed, developed, refined, and 
adopted. 
Related to this feature, the development of norms operates primarily 
through networks of loosely connected actors rather than in top-down, 
command-and-control fashion. In the classic international law system, 
legal rules fall into relatively clear categories and hierarchies, with inter-
national law binding states and national or local law governing legal 
persons, even though this system is less integrated and definite than 
domestic law. This makes it possible, in principle, to assess the norma-
tive force of rules and to determine which should apply in a particular 
situation. 
By contrast, in a galaxy comprised of networks, normative systems 
overlap and influence one another. An important consequence of the 
networked nature of the Business and Human Rights Galaxy is what 
transnational law scholars Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers  
192. NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 82 (2d ed. 2014). 
193. JESSICA F. GREEN, RETHINKING PRIVATE AUTHORITY: AGENTS AND ENTREPRENEURS IN GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 29 (2014). 
194. Id. at 27. 
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describe as “recursivity.”195 This reflects the fact that various actors com-
pete to have their respective descriptions and diagnoses become the 
accepted way to identify what is labeled as a problem, as well as the 
appropriate response to it. 
Finally, as we have described, the clusters of norms in each ring of 
the Galaxy are not readily reducible to characterization as “hard” or 
“soft law,” or as voluntary or mandatory. Compliance with voluntary 
standards in ring four of the Galaxy, for instance, is often monitored by 
NGOs, consumer groups, and investors who may criticize a company 
for failing to adhere to them. This can serve as a form of informal 
enforcement, with serious financial and reputational consequences. 
Companies may also incorporate voluntary standards into their con-
tracts with retailers and manufacturers, so that compliance with the 
standards becomes a legal obligation. Voluntary standards and princi-
ples also may become sufficiently accepted that they serve as a model 
for national legislation. Finally, rules and norms can circulate through-
out networks, with various actors incorporating them into their prac-
tices in ways that reinforce their influence.196 As transnational law 
scholar Sigrid Quack has observed, this process “represents global insti-
tution building that involves continuous transformations between ‘soft’ 
and ‘hard’ regulation.”197 
Sigrid Quack, Legal Professionals and Transnational Law-Making: A Case of Distributed Agency, 14(5) 
ORG. ART. 643-44 (2007), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1350508407080313. 
In the next section, we discuss the implica-
tions of these features of the Galaxy for the new French statutory duty 
of vigilance. 
V. THE DUTY OF VIGILANCE 
Several issues remain open for clarification with respect to the opera-
tion of the French statutory duty of vigilance. As we suggest below, ref-
erence to norms in various rings of the Business and Human Rights 
Galaxy may be useful in this process as a source of guidance for admin-
istrative guidelines, judicial decisions, and corporate compliance pro-
grams. We will not discuss in detail the provisions of each of these 
sources, nor suggest what specific provisions of each source should 
inform interpretation of the French statutory duty. Our purpose is sim-
ply to identify a few of the potential sources of guidance that are avail-
able in the Galaxy of which the duty of vigilance is now a part. 
195. TERRENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND 
SYSTEMATIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 132 (2009). 
196. See generally Hale & Held, supra note 28. 
197. 
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A. Subsidiaries, Subcontractors, and Suppliers 
The first issue is the scope of the entities with respect to which a com-
pany has a duty of vigilance. To reiterate, the French law imposes a duty 
of vigilance upon a company with regard to the “companies that it con-
trols within the meaning of Article L. 233-16, II [of the Commercial 
Code], directly or indirectly, as well as the activities of subcontractors or 
suppliers with whom they have an established commercial relationship, 
when these activities are related to this relationship.”198 
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-102-4, https://www. 
business-humanrights.org/en/french-duty-of-vigilance-bill-english-translation. Section 1 of the 
French Trade and Industry Code provides that the law applies to “any company that employs, at 
the end of two consecutive years, at least five thousand employees within itself, as well as within its 
direct or indirect subsidiaries headquartered on French territory, or at least ten thousand 
employees within itself, as well as within its direct or indirect subsidiaries headquartered on 
French territory or abroad . . . establishes and implement an effective vigilance plan.” 
The relevant 
section of the Commercial Code relies on consolidated accounting and 
the group management report as the basis for a determination of con-
trol that is sufficient to establish a parent-subsidiary relationship.199 As 
French lawyers and business and human rights experts Ste´phane 
Brabant, Charlotte Michon, and Elsa Sovourey note,200 that section 
focuses on the ability of a company “to have decision-making power, in 
particular over the financial and operational policies of another en-
tity.”201 Such authority may be legal, contractual, or de facto.202 Entities 
subject to such control would be regarded effectively as subsidiaries of 
the company. 
By contrast, the reference in the French statute to subcontractors 
and suppliers is more ambiguous with regard to its scope. An initial ver-
sion of the law established responsibility for subcontractors over which 
the company exercises “a decisive influence.”203 This concept of deci-
sive influence resembles concepts of business relations in the OECD 
Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, or sphere of influence in the 
U.N. Global Compact, which take into account the amount of 
198. 
199. The original text provides: “A corporation is deemed to exercise control over another 
corporation according to Article L-233-16 of the French Commercial Code when it controls 
directly or indirectly a majority of the voting shares or when it has authority to appoint the 
majority of executive management” (translated by authors). 
200. Ste´phane Brabant and Elsa Savourey are French lawyers and recognized experts in 
Business and Human Rights; Charlotte Michon is a French jurist and also an expert in Business 
and Human Rights. She is the executive director of EDH France. See Brabant, Savourey & Michon, 
supra note 25. 
201. Id. at 2. 
202. Id. 
203. Assemble´e Nationale, supra note 13. 
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influence that the contracting company is capable of exercising on the 
subcontractor or supplier.204 
Companies could claim that the eventual language of the French law 
suggests inclusion only of tier one suppliers and subcontractors. This 
interpretation, however, would seem to be inconsistent with the explan-
atory statement accompanying the legislation, which indicates that the 
aim of the law is to prevent disasters such as occurred at Rana Plaza.205 
In addition, the December 2013 PCN France report regarding the tex-
tile industry highlighted the risks posed by subcontracting by suppliers 
in this sector.206 
National Contact Point Report on Implementation of the OECD Guidelines in the Textile and 
Clothing Sector, Following a Referral from Nicole Bricq, NAT’L CONTACT POINT (Dec. 2, 2013), 
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Ressources/8507_rapport-du-pcn-sur-la-mise-en-oeuvre- 
des-principes-directeurs-de-l-ocde-dans-la-filiere-textile-habillement. 
This suggests that a contracting company with reason 
to be aware of risks beyond the first tier of suppliers and subcontractors 
would have a duty of vigilance with respect to such risks. 
Interpretation of this provision might also draw upon jurisprudence 
on the common law duty of care, particularly with respect to the ele-
ment of proximity. As international lawyer and scholar Rene´e-Claude 
Drouin has observed, this case law deals with responsibility for the 
actions of subsidiaries rather than entities in the supply chain.207 
Nonetheless, the requirement of proximity directs attention to whether 
“the circumstances surrounding the existing relation between the 
plaintiff and the defendant are such that one can conclude that the de-
fendant is required to be attentive to the plaintiff’s legitimate interests 
in its business management.”208 As we have described, this may be the 
case if, analogizing from Chandler v. Cape, a subcontractor’s or suppli-
er’s employees reasonably expect that a company has assumed responsi-
bility for providing protection from certain risks.209 It also could be the 
case if, as in Choc v. Hudbay, a company has made public declarations of 
its commitments with regard to the human rights impacts of its opera-
tions and has indicated its intention to work with the local community 
to prevent rights violations.210 
204. Queinnec, La notion de sp’e`re d’influencœur coeur de la RSE, lecture juridique d’un phe´nome`ne 
normatif, JOURNAL DES SOCIE´TE´S 66 (July 2012). 
205. Brabant, Savourey & Michon, supra note 25, at 4. 
206. 
207. Rene´e-Claude Drouin, Le de´veloppement du contentieux a` l’encontre des entreprises 
transnationales : quel roˆle pour le devoir de vigilance?, DROIT SOCIAL 246, 254 (Mar. 2016). 
208. Id. 
209. Chandler v. Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525, ¶ 62-71 (UK). 
210. Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414, ¶ 67-68 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
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Brabant, Michon, and Savourey also suggest that drawing on the 
UNGPs could lead to an interpretation of the statute that provides for a 
robust duty of vigilance to encompass a significant number of entities 
in a company’s value chain.211 They note that the duty of diligence in 
the UNGPs focuses on adverse impacts that a company may cause 
or contribute to through its own activities, or those that may be 
directly linked to the company’s operations, products, or services.212 
Companies are expected to remedy the first two types of impacts, and 
to use their leverage to try to prevent or minimize the third type. This is 
because the law focuses on the types of entities in question, rather than 
the extent of a company’s involvement in adverse human rights 
impacts.213 
They suggest, however, that also imposing a duty of vigilance with 
respect to impacts to which a company is directly linked would be more 
consistent with the intent of the law to reinforce the UNGPs. As they 
note, “a company may be linked to an adverse impact through any of 
the business partners and its value chain.”214 They propose that this 
principle “could therefore interact with that of the established commer-
cial relationship and . . . advocate for a more inclusive, rather than 
exclusive, vision of entities falling under the ambit of the vigilance 
plan.”215 The potentially wide scope of this duty would be qualified by 
the emphasis in the statute on preventing “severe” impacts on human 
rights,216 
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-102-4, https://www. 
business-humanrights.org/en/french-duty-of-vigilance-bill-english-translation (Fr.) (stating that 
“the plan shall include the reasonable vigilance measures to allow for risk identification and for 
the prevention of severe violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, serious bodily 
injury or environmental damage or health risks”). 
and by the acknowledgment in the UNGPs of the need to es-
tablish priorities with respect to the risks that should be avoided. 
Defining the scope of the duty of vigilance in this way would be con-
sistent, not only with the UNGP, but with the European Directive on 
Non-Financial Reporting. The latter instrument provides that compa-
nies must report on the risks of severe adverse social and environmental 
impacts.217 It states that “[t]he risks of adverse impact may stem from 
211. Brabant, Savourey & Michon, supra note 25, at 4-6. 
212. Id. at 5. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 6. 
216. 
217. Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2014 Amending Directive 2103/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-financial and Diversity 
Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 6. 
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the undertaking’s own activities or may be linked to its operations, and, 
where relevant and proportionate, its products, services and business 
relationships, including its supply and subcontracting chains.”218 
There are, no doubt, insights from other types of norms in the 
Business and Human Rights Galaxy that may be useful in determining 
the scope of a company’s duty of vigilance. Our discussion is simply 
meant to emphasize the ways in which norms located in different rings 
of that Galaxy, whether legally enforceable or not, may help determine 
the scope of this potentially open-ended duty. 
B. The Vigilance Plan 
Recall that the French statute requires that a vigilance plan include 
five components.219 
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] Art. L. 225-102-4, https://www. 
business-humanrights.org/en/french-duty-of-vigilance-bill-english-translation (Fr.). 
These are: (1) risk mapping, which involves identi-
fying, analyzing, and setting priorities among risks; (2) regular assess-
ment of relevant subsidiaries, subcontractors, and suppliers; (3) actions 
to mitigate risks or prevent severe impacts; (4) a mechanism to alert a 
company of the existence or materialization of risks; and (5) monitor-
ing and evaluating the effectiveness of implementation measures.220 
These measures correspond to the main elements of the duty to 
respect set forth in the UNGPs. Article 13(a) of the UNGPs says that 
this duty requires that businesses “[a]void causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address 
such impacts when they occur,” and that they “[s]eek to prevent or miti-
gate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their oper-
ations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they 
have not contributed to those impacts.221 Article 17 emphasizes that 
conducting human rights due diligence is a crucial way that companies 
can identify potential impacts and seek to avoid or mitigate them.222 As 
it states, “The process should include assessing actual and potential 
human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, track-
ing responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.”223 
Moreover, the UNGPs emphasize the importance of consultation with 
stakeholders in this process.224 The Constitutional Council ruled that 
218. Id. pmbl. ¶ 8. 
219. 
220. Id. 
221. UNGP, supra note 17, art. 13. 
222. Id., art. 17. 
223. Id. 
224. Id., art. 18. 
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this was recommended—rather than required—by the statute,225 but it 
will be essential in order to ensure that a plan is not reduced to simply a 
form of an internal audit. 
What criteria should be used to determine whether a plan has 
adequately incorporated these required measures? Soft law instruments 
may be useful in answering this question. The OECD, for instance, has 
developed Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct,226 as 
well as a set of guidelines for conducting due diligence in specific 
industry sectors.227 In addition, the International Business Leaders 
Forum (IBLF) and the IFC, in association with the U.N. Global 
Compact, has published a Guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment and 
Management.228 This provides step-by-step guidance on preparation for 
conducting due diligence and impact assessment; identification of 
human rights risks; engagement with stakeholders; assessment of 
impacts; mitigation of harms; implementing a mitigation plan and inte-
grating human rights within business operations; evaluating impacts; 
and reporting to stakeholders.229 
Guidance also may be available from non-financial reporting direc-
tives. France was a pioneer in requiring such reports as part of its 2001 
law adopting new economic regulations.230 This obligation has been 
progressively extended to more companies, while the scope of informa-
tion required has widened with respect to “the way in which the com-
pany takes into account the social and environmental consequences of 
its activities.”231 
Similarly, the 2014 EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive prescribes 
that companies communicate “the principal risks related to those mat-
ters linked to the undertaking’s operations including, where relevant 
225. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2017-750DC, Mar. 23, 
2017 (Fr.). 
226. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR 
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT (2018). 
227. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES (2011). 
228. INT’L BUS. LEADERS FORUM ET AL., GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT (2010). 
229. Id. at 6-7. 
230. Loi 2001-420 du 15 mai 2001, relative aux nouvelles re´gulations e´conomiques, art. 116 
[Law 2001-420 of May 15, 2001 on relative to new economic regulations, section 116], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 15, 2001, 
p. 7776. 
231. De´cret 2012-557 du 24 avril 2012 [concerning companies’ obligations of transparence in 
social and environmental matters], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Apr. 26, 2012. 
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and proportionate, its business relationships, products or services 
which are likely to cause adverse impacts in those areas, and how the 
undertaking manages those risks.”232 The Directive also requires com-
panies to provide information on “the due diligence processes imple-
mented by the undertaking, also regarding, where relevant and 
proportionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in order to iden-
tify, prevent and mitigate existing and potential adverse impacts.”233 
Notably, in light of the fact that the French duty of vigilance requires 
measures to identify “severe” adverse impacts, the Directive requires 
reporting “in relation to matters that stand out as being most likely to 
bring about the materialisation of principal risks of severe impacts, along 
with those that have already materialized. The severity of such impacts 
should be judged by their scale and gravity.”234 
The 2017 French incorporation of the EU Directive provides that 
non-financial reporting must present the business model of the com-
pany and, for each relevant category of information, “a description of 
the main risks linked to the company’s activity or to all the companies’ 
activities, including, when that is both pertinent and proportional, the 
risks generated by its business relations, its products, or its services.”235 
Moreover, the declaration inserted in the report must contain a 
description of the company’s policies that are applied with respect to, 
when appropriate, due diligence procedures implemented to prevent, 
identify, and mitigate risks, as well as the results of these policies, 
including key performance indicators. 
The most recent requirements of the new French Decree (Ordonnance) 
on non-financial reporting, which came into force in July 2017,236 con-
verge with the requirements of the French law on Duty of Vigilance. 
232. Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330/1), art. 1 ¶ 1(d). 
233. Id. pmbl. ¶ 6. 
234. Id. pmbl. ¶ 8 (emphasis added). 
235. Ord. 2017-1180 du 19 juillet 2017, relative a` la publication d’informations non financie`res 
par certaines grandes entreprises et certains groupes d’entreprises art. 1, III [Ord. 2017-1180 of 
July 19, 2017 regarding the publication of non-financial information by some large companies 
and some groups of companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 21, 2018; Be´atrice Parance & Elise Groulx, La de´claration de performance 
extra-financie`re, nouvelle ambition du reporting extra-financier [The Extra Financial Statement, the 
New Ambition of Extra Financial Reporting], 11 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE ENTREPRISE ET AFFAIRES 
1128 (2018). 
236. Ord. 2017-1180 du 19 juillet 2017, relative a` la publication d’informations non financie`res 
par certaines grandes entreprises et certains groupes d’entreprises art. 1, III [Ord. 2017-1180 of 
July 19, 2017 regarding the publication of non-financial information by some large companies 
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and some groups of companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 21, 2018. 
Over time, the new Decree may have the effect of strengthening the 
French law. 
The French Decree establishes an obligation to report (obligation de 
dire) while the French Statute on Duty of Vigilance creates an obligation 
to act (obligation de faire). Corporations are subject to respect both laws 
and must comply using the same corporate information. 
The first generation of French legislation on non-financial reporting 
(Loi Grenelle 2, 2010 and its decree of 2012)237 could be interpreted as 
mandating a box ticking or “checklist” exercise. In contrast, the second 
generation of legislation (Ordinance or Decree on Non- Financial 
Reporting and Law of Duty of Vigilance of 2017) establishes a series of 
more substantial requirements: (1) risk mapping; (2) regular risk 
assessments of relevant partners; (3) actions to mitigate risks and pre-
vent severe impacts; (4) alert mechanisms about risks and their materi-
alization; (5) monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of 
implementation measures.238 
Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement; Loi 
2012-557 du 24 avril 2012, relatif aux obligations de transparence des entreprises en matie`re sociale 
et environnementale; CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-102-4, 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/french-duty-of-vigilance-bill-english-translation (Fr.). 
To meet all these requirements, corpora-
tions need to do more than “box ticking.” 
Moreover, exercising the duty of vigilance requires the enterprise to 
adopt a global vision of the corporate social responsibility and sustain-
ability policies of the parent corporation, its subsidiaries, subcontrac-
tors, and suppliers. It must reach beyond “silos” of traditional 
compliance programs to conduct a wider and more thorough risk 
assessment of the corporate group and its key business partners. 
The vigilance plan required by the French statute thus must be seen 
as but one of several types of reports on human rights impacts that com-
panies have been required to provide in recent years. A company pre-
paring its plan can draw on its own, and other companies’, experience 
in complying with similar reporting norms in the second ring of the 
Galaxy. In addition, it can look to soft law guidance in the fifth ring of 
237. Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement [Law 
2010-788 of July 12, 2010 confirming national commitment on the environment], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13, 2010; Loi 
2012-557 du 24 avril 2012, relatif aux obligations de transparence des entreprises en matie`re 
sociale et environnementale [Law 2012-557 of April 24, 2012 on the new transparency 
requirements of corporations relative to social and environmental issues], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA RE´PUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] Apr. 24, 2012. 
238. 
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the Galaxy, such as OECD and Global Compact models for due dili-
gence and human rights impact analysis, respectively. 
C. Reasonableness and Foreseeability 
The French statute requires that a vigilance plan contain “reasonable 
vigilance measures adequate to identify the risks and to prevent gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, of health and 
security of people, as well as of the environment.”239 Use of the term 
“reasonable” reflects the desire for a balance between the need to pro-
tect human, social, and environmental concerns on the one hand and, 
on the other, the fact that a multinational company is involved in activ-
ity in numerous markets and that it relies on numerous parties in an 
extended supply chain. 
The court in Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. acknowledged these poten-
tially competing concerns in describing the parties’ claims regarding 
the public policy considerations relevant to the case. Hudbay Minerals 
expressed the concern that holding a parent corporation responsible 
for the actions of its subsidiaries would create unduly expansive liability, 
expose Canadian companies to numerous lawsuits, and violate the prin-
ciple of limited liability companies based on the separate legal identity 
of parent and subsidiary corporations.240 The plaintiffs countered that 
finding such a responsibility would encourage Canadian companies to 
respect human rights, further the government’s goal of reducing viola-
tions of human rights by Canadian companies’ operations, and reduce 
the asymmetry between the global scope of business operations and the 
locally limited scope of tort law.241 The court admitted the force of each 
set of claims, but concluded that it was more appropriate to attempt to 
balance them on a trial record rather than in reviewing a motion to 
dismiss.242 
The French law’s imposition of a duty on companies to engage in a 
particular analytical process, rather than the imposition of liability for 
all harms committed by its subsidiaries, subcontractors, and suppliers, 
reflects an effort to strike a balance that takes account of the concerns 
expressed by both sides in the Hudbay case. The obligation thus is to  
239. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-102-4 pmbl. (Fr.) (trans. by 
authors). 
240. Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414, ¶ 72 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
241. Id. ¶ 73. 
242. Id. ¶ 74. 
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provide the means (obligation de moyens) rather than to ensure a certain 
outcome (obligation de re´sultat).243 
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that compliance with the 
French law will involve establishing priorities to ensure identification of 
the most serious types of risks. The law itself contemplates this 
approach,244 and the UNGPs provide support for it in the commentary 
to Article 17: 
Where business enterprises have large numbers of entities in 
their value chains it may be unreasonably difficult to conduct 
due diligence for adverse human rights impacts across them 
all. If so, business enterprises should identify general areas 
where the risk of adverse human rights impacts is most signifi-
cant, whether due to certain suppliers’ or clients’ operating 
context, the particular operations, products or services 
involved, or other relevant considerations, and prioritize these 
for human rights due diligence.245 
Judges, therefore, should be well aware that most companies will not 
be able to immediately identify and prevent all risks along their supply 
chain. The judges are likely to be receptive to a vigilance plan that 
includes gradual but steady growth in prevention and management 
measures to address an expanding set of risks, ideally in collaboration 
with stakeholders. 
Finally, the French duty of vigilance may exert its own gravitational 
pull in the Galaxy, encouraging common law jurisdictions to recognize 
a duty of care for parent companies with respect to the risk of human 
rights violations by their subsidiaries, subcontractors, and suppliers. 
Convergence around this norm will provide transnational companies a 
set of guiding principles and a common approach to human rights due 
diligence. 
D. Extraterritorial Application of the Duty 
The French law does not directly address whether its scope is extra-
territorial, although the goal of the law would seem naturally to call for 
extraterritorial application. The drafters mentioned this issue in the  
243. Parance & Groulx, supra note 66, at 21. 
244. The law requires a mapping of risks. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] 
art. L. 225-102-4 at ¶ 1 (Fr.). 
245. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, HR/PUB/11/04, at 19 (June 16, 2011). 
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law’s explanatory comments.246 The issue should be less difficult for 
damages resulting from harm to the environment. Article Eight of the 
Rome Regulation assigns competence to the law that governs the opera-
tive event that produces damage, which arguably would be the failure 
of the parent company to fulfill its duty of vigilance if the risk of harm is 
reasonably foreseeable. Had the French legislature expressly defined 
the vigilance statute as a police law, this would have provided a firmer 
basis for extraterritorial application of the statute. We anticipate, how-
ever, that practice and legal doctrine will evolve in this direction over 
time. 
At the same time, courts in the United Kingdom,247 Canada, and the 
Netherlands appear to be increasingly less stringent in applying the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens in cases involving allegations of 
human rights violations in countries where there is some doubt about 
the ability of plaintiffs to receive an adequate assessment of their 
claims. 
U.K. tribunals have shown similar willingness to permit civil tort suits 
for alleged violations of human rights perpetrated abroad by companies 
headquartered in the United Kingdom.248 Courts rely on the common 
law duty of care in doing so.249 
Rob Edwards, Liability of a Parent Company: Chandler v. Cape Plc, DWF LLP (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/187638/employee+rights+labour+relations/Liability+Of+A+Parent+ 
Company+Chandler+V+Cape+Plc. 
The 2016 decision in Dominic Liswaniso 
Lungowe & Others v. Vedanta Resources Plc and KCM reflects this trend. In 
this case, the court allowed an action to proceed in the United Kingdom 
against Vedanta, a mining company headquartered in England, and its 
Zambian subsidiary, Konkola Copper, that alleged grave environmental 
damage due to Vedanta’s breach of its duty of care.250 
Xandra Kramer, UK Court on Tort Litigation Against Transnational Corporations, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS (June 23, 2016), http://conflictoflaws.net/2016/uk-court-on-tort-litigation-against- 
transnational-corporations/. 
The court also  
246. Olivera Boskovic, Bre`ves remarques sur le devoir de vigilance et le droit international prive´, 
EUROPE´EN ET INTERNATIONAL, 2016, at 385 (Fr.); Horatia Muir Watt, Devoir de vigilance et droit 
international prive´: Rev. int. Compliance 2017, dossier spe´cial Loi relative au devoir de vigilance, une 
perspective pratique et multidimensionnelle, SCIENCESPO, May 17, 2018, at 48 (Fr.). 
247. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1386 (stating that forum non conveniens 
cannot be used for British companies in the United Kingdom, although it can still be an issue for 
foreign subsidiaries of British parent companies). 
248. Richard Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human 
Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the United States, 3:1 CITY UNIV. OF HONG KONG L.R. 1 
(2011). 
249. 
250. 
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found that the doctrine of forum non conveniens251 was inapplicable in 
the interests of justice.252 The Civil Division for the Court of Appeal 
rejected Vedanta’s appeal in 2017.253 
Martyn Day & Oliver Holland, Court of Appeal upholds ruling that claims by Zambian villagers 
against mining giant can be heard in UK court, LEIGH DAY (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.leighday.co. 
uk/News/News-2017/October-2017/Court-of-Appeal-upholds-ruling-that-claims-by-Zamb www. 
business-humanrights.org. 
On January 15 and 16, 2019, the U.K. Supreme Court in London 
heard the latest appeal, and issued a decision on April 10 finding in 
favor of the complainants.254 
Gabrielle Holly, Zambia Farmers Can Take Vedanta to Court over Water Pollution. What Are the 
Legal Implications?, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR. (Oct. 4, 2018) https://www.business- 
humanrights.org/en/zambian-farmers-can-take-vedanta-to-court-over-water-pollution-what-are- 
the-legal-implications. 
The court quite easily concluded that 
the proper place for trial would have been Zambia,255 but for seri-
ous concerns as to substantial justice issues in Zambia, primarily 
related to funding. In allowing the suit to proceed on the merits, 
the court’s test of substantial justice is derived essentially from two 
factors: 
First, the practicable impossibility of funding such group 
claims where the claimants were all in extreme poverty; and 
secondly, the absence within Zambia of sufficiently substantial 
and suitably experienced legal teams to enable litigation of this 
size and complexity to be prosecuted effectively, in particular 
against a defendant (KCM) with a track record which suggested 
that it would prove an obdurate opponent.256 
In Canada, three recent cases illustrate this trend. Choc v. Hudbay 
Minerals, Inc., which we have discussed above, concerned the alleged 
forced violent eviction by a Canadian parent company’s security forces 
of a local community near a subsidiary’s operations in Guatemala. The  
251. It is to be noted that the legal theory of forum non conveniens can no longer be used for 
British companies in the United Kingdom following the ECJ 2005 judgment in Owusu v. Jackson, 
although it can still be an issue for foreign subsidiaries of British parent companies. Owusu, 2005 
E.C.R. I-1386. 
252. Id. 
253. 
254. 
255. See Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414, ¶ 85-87 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) 
(noting that concluding the proper place for trial was anywhere but Zambia would offend the 
common sense). 
256. Id. ¶ 89. 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
356 [Vol. 50 
Ontario Superior Court allowed the suit to move forward, and Hudbay 
decided not to appeal with regard to the forum non-conveniens issue.257 
Hudbay Minerals Lawsuits (re Guatemala), BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., https://www. 
business-humanrights.org/en/hudbay-minerals-lawsuits-re-guatemala-0#c18034 (last visited Apr. 
3, 2019). 
In January 2017, the British Columbia Court of Appeals in Garcia v. 
Tahoe Resources issued a holding with regard to a lawsuit brought 
by Guatemalan victims against a Canadian mining company.258 
Overturning a 2015 lower court that had ruled that Canada was not the 
forum conveniens, the court of appeals decided that the case could be 
brought in Canada.259 
Susan Taylor, Court Sets Canada as Jurisdiction for Guatemalan Suit Against Tahoe, CAN. CTR. 
FOR INT’L JUSTICE, www.ccij.ca/news/court-sets-canada-jurisdiction-guatemalan-suit-tahoe (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
This decision260 
Susan Taylor, Update 1-Canada Set as Jurisdiction for Guatemalan Suit Against Tahoe Resource, 
REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/guatemala-mining-tahoe-resources- 
idUSL1N1FH004.  
was hailed as an important prec-
edent, authorizing jurisdiction in Canada for a suit alleging human 
rights violations committed abroad by a Canadian company. 
Finally, the November 2017 decision by the British Columbia Court 
of Appeals in Araya v. Nevsun Resources Ltd261 confirmed the position 
taken in Garcia v. Tahoe Resources. In the Nevsun case the plaintiffs 
alleged forced labor, slavery, torture, and perpetration of crimes 
against humanity in the exploitation of the defendant’s (Nevsun 
Resources Ltd) mine in Eritrea.262 The British Columbia Court of 
Appeals admitted that adjudicating the claim in Canada would result in 
numerous logistical difficulties. It nonetheless affirmed the lower 
court’s decision to accept jurisdiction, because serious doubts existed 
as to the possibility that the plaintiffs would receive a fair trial in 
Eritrea. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s arguments that 
accepting jurisdiction could have political and diplomatic repercus-
sions because it would reflect an implicit criticism of the judicial system 
of another sovereign. The court also rejected the claim that individuals 
do not have civil remedies with regard to peremptory violations of jus 
cogens norms committed by companies because customary international 
law does not recognize individuals as legal subjects.263 On January 23, 
the Supreme Court of Canada heard an appeal from Nevsun lodging 
the arguments that (a) customary international law has no place in 
257. 
258. Garcia v. Tahoe Resources Inc., [2017] BCCA 39 (Can.). 
259. 
260. 
261. Araya v. Nevsun Resources Ltd., [2017] BCCA 401 (Can.). 
262. Id. 
263. Counsel for the plaintiffs in the Araya case are law firms Camp Fiorante Matthews 
Mogerman LLP and Siskinds LLP and international human rights lawyer James Yap. 
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Canadian courts, and (b) the “act of state” doctrine indicates this 
should be a diplomatic matter, and not a legal one.264 
Jamie Kneen, Can Slave Labour Charges Against Canadian Company Be Heard in Court in 
Canada? Supreme Court of Canada Hears Arguments Today, MININGWATCH CAN. (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://www.miningwatch.ca/blog/2019/1/23/can-slave-labour-charges-against-canadian-company- 
be-heard-court-canada-supreme-court. 
The decision is 
still pending. 
In the Netherlands, several activities related to alleged tort claims suf-
fered by Nigerian nationals resulted in the exercise of Dutch jurisdic-
tion over Royal Dutch Shell, a company headquartered in the 
Netherlands, for breach of care that resulted in serious environmental 
damages inflicted by its Nigerian subsidiary. The scope of a common 
law norm (the duty of care) was applied and interpreted by Dutch tribu-
nals, which operate under a civil law system, because the relevant facts 
occurred in Nigeria, a common law country. In 2013, one Dutch court 
found Shell liable for the actions of its Nigerian subsidiary and ordered 
that the company pay damages to the victims. 265 
Anthony Deutsch & Ivana Sekularac, Dutch Court says Shell Responsible for Nigeria Spills, 
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2013), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-shell-nigeria-lawsuit-idUKBRE90T 
0DC20130130. 
In 2015, the Dutch 
Court of Appeals held that it could not find in principle that Shell 
could not be sued for its subsidiaries’ negligent actions, although proof 
of liability would have to be proved at trial.266 
Dutch Court: Shell can be liable for Nigeria spills, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 18, 2015), www.aljazeera. 
com/news/2015/12/dutch-court-shell-liable-nigeria-spills-151218120516428.html. 
This has cleared the way 
for trials in the Netherlands based on the claims against the parent 
company headquartered in that country. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The new French statutory duty of vigilance is one of the most recent 
norms to emerge in the Business and Human Rights Galaxy.267 
Worthy of mention, without going into detail, is the fact that the French legislature has 
adopted a new law: La Loi Pacte (Pact Law) in an accelerated procedure. PACTE means plan 
d’action pour la croissance et la transformation des entreprises (action plan for the growth and 
transformation of corporations). Amongst its very numerous dispositions, the law contains a 
provision, article 61, that modifies the Civil Code and the Code of Commerce in two ways. 
(1) First, for all corporations, the reform introduces the requirement to consider the social and 
environmental impacts of their activities in the corporation’s social purpose. (2) Moreover, the 
reform introduces the notion of benefit-corporation into French corporate law. Corporations 
may also include in their social purpose a mission statement that they deem representative. This 
Bill was finally adopted in Paris by both the National Assembly and the Senate on April 11, 2019. 
The Constitutional Council subsequently confirmed its constitutionality, and it will will enter into 
force on May 24, 2019. La loi PACTE adopte´e par le Parlement, REPUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE, https://www. 
economie.gouv.fr/plan-entreprises-pacte (last visited May 20, 2019). 
It 
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resembles several existing measures in its focus on corporate process 
rather than on outcomes and its basis on the premise that business 
enterprises are in the best position to identify and take steps to mini-
mize the adverse effects of their operations. Like the common law duty 
of care, it is an enforceable obligation that is framed in broad terms. 
This means that guidance on its interpretation and application is avail-
able from other sources of norms in the Galaxy, such as common law 
tort jurisprudence, voluntary private standards of conduct, and soft law 
on due diligence. Each of these elements may exert some gravitational 
force in the development of the duty. 
At the same time, the duty of vigilance is novel in its application to 
subsidiaries, subcontractors, and suppliers. In this respect, it reflects 
what Douglas Cassel argues is the next logical step in the evolution of 
the common law duty of care.268 This means that the French law has the 
potential to exert its own gravitational force on other norms in the 
Galaxy, achieving greater alignment between the benefits that parent 
corporations receive from separate entities that they control, or with 
which they have close relationships, and the responsibility to ensure 
that such entities minimize harm to others. We must ultimately remem-
ber, however, that the gravitational forces that compete for influence 
are not natural phenomena that operate of their own accord. They, 
instead, are the product of politics and human agency, as actors contest 
and negotiate the obligations of the modern transnational business 
enterprise and its far-flung operations and impacts.   
268. See Cassel, supra note 69. 
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